

Proofs in Medieval History

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1. Introduction: The word ‘proof’ appears on numerous occasions in the published works of this research: *Bannockburn Revealed* (BR) 2000, *Bannockburn Proved* (BP) 2004/5, *The Genius of Bannockburn* (GB), 2010, *The Genius Summary* (2010), *Bruce’s Genius Battle* (BGB) 2013, and *Bannockburn: The Poem* (BTP), 2014. All of them have proofs, several, often; some of great length. Never in the entire twenty years of these productions has the word ‘proof’ been mentioned by any active historian. Only Cowan has mentioned the books (in 2016) but not the word ‘proof’. Many, perhaps following Barrow, Duncan, Watson, Cowan, do not believe proof is possible in an event seven centuries ago. In this article I will try to examine the concept as it has grown in these books over the years, I will give a full proof of the battlesite (and more: of the battle not just the site) and, because I believe it will be useful, a short proof, because the important points are focused by omitting lesser but necessary things. The books all have this already: short proofs as well as long ones. I will also give an elementary proof from mathematics as an aid to understanding the difference; and try to express what I mean by proof in medieval history. However, the long proof provided herein does this itself.¹ Quotations from the chronicle sources have references, two, often, are preceded by the date of writing, which is important in rating its reliability but may count from close to the battle because many of those relevant were written within days of it, which experience in the work of Sir F.C. Bartlett F.R.S. at Cambridge with undergraduates in serial transmission of a story, makes possible (after seven transmissions it is unrecognisable, a process that starts at the first). Where the source is confused, conflated, mistaken,... an interpolation in brackets accounts for it in most cases. Some statements that seem unnecessary may be retained because they are important: such as the reaction of Le Baker to the ‘drinkhail and wassail’ of the English before the battle. This is a major factor in their loss: overconfidence. That is why they are all drunk. They are not afraid, the reverse. There are explanations all through of the interior events. There are corollaries about the map, training with pikes, the pikes being set twice, how Bruce got his men to believe they could win etc, each with its own proof. Three propositions are enough to prove the case and nine chronicle sources establish it. Other sources are important such as the ground itself and the map and all the other maps consulted and the other places visited often and long term residents consulted and a vast library of books and documents.

Finally, I will deal with the issue of the appointment of professors of medieval history. In this, I will highlight some of the mental attributes possessed, ideally, by someone to be appointed. The errors of these various professors mentioned here, and elsewhere in this website, would never have been committed, had the potential for them to be committed been understood at the time they were appointed. They would not have been appointed at all. There are occasions herein when, confronted with the evidence, I have been compelled to protest. Ideally, one should deal with one thing at a time, within a structure. I have decided to retain the protests. The work (their absence of useful ‘work’: I do not recognise it as work) cries out for protests, calls them forth. These matter, even more than the solution of the problems addressed. For if resolved, fully, the current failure within the Community to make any sort of progress beyond Barbour in the 14th century will end and a new culture of investigation, rigour, honesty, respectful response to challenge, respect for originality

and new procedures will be possible. The Community is a closed shop, disregards outsiders, ignores them, ostensibly because (so they say) they are perceived not to be learned in the subject or are not respectful of those taken to be experts. Instead, they are ignored because they are superior. Being outsiders, they are unbiased, not subject to the prejudices of the community which has made no progress in seven centuries. The outsider working alone is best placed to overcome the log jam of prejudice built up over the centuries, which owes its existence, partly due to those in control being able to shut down originality which is dangerous to their speculations (all they were ever capable of) by with-holding degrees, awards, publication, reviews, funding, jobs and promotions. The success of the outsider is partly due to different education, experience, more time and far more dedicated work. This research has been obstructed at every stage, efforts made to bury it out of sight. Not mentioned by any active historian for 16 years, even in a bibliography until Cowan did in 2016 doing his utmost to undermine it dishonestly to save his own face for he had been judge of the Saltire Society Research Award in 2005 when *Bannockburn Proved* was entered and did not read it, as supporters of my work recognised when he published an article in a booklet on Bannockburn in the Scotsman a few years later which showed he had learnt nothing, still had a Scottish cavalry charge. Taxed with his failure he said: 'Who reads everything?' He could not even draw the modern map: he had Gillies Hill south and not west of Coxet Hill. His version was the same as Barbour's. He had learned nothing, knew nothing.

Why did he not read it? Look at the cover of *Bannockburn Proved* (in Books section, website). The reviews could not have been better and were by abler people than Cowan, and Cowan knew it for he knew Sheriff Irvine Smith QC, the finest Scottish advocate of his generation, also a historian, who taught history at Glasgow University for 12 years. After Irvine had been only four years at the bar, he was chosen to defend the last man in Scotland who might have been hung. Irvine got him off; saved his life. He and Cowan had appeared on the same panel of speakers.

It is unlikely that this research will have any effect upon these. But many able people outside the community have already seen the expertise in these articles and books. Excluding outsiders is, in reality, a means of protecting the speculations of those in control, all they were ever capable of. Why else has no progress in the subject been made in seven centuries?

Sins committed for preserving status are almost impossible to correct. The young easily adopt the defences of the old, even the failed ones. A point returned to within. Indeed, that the new historians have had as role models, the failed historians of the past, is a reason for their own failures. Is it accidental that Watson, in 2001, sited the battle on the Dryfield at the High School where her school teacher said it was and Barrow put it almost half a century before? Because authoritarian professors required the obedience of their students? Or indoctrinated them in the correct procedures: swallow John Barbour and do not look anywhere else? 'We say it is this. So believe this.' We have made no progress in seven centuries, who do you think you are, that you believe you can? We are here to teach you what you can and cannot do.' Since no progress came forth, this has to be a factor.

Beyond all these, I think it desirable to describe and explore the psychology of the historians I have had to deal with. This should matter to everyone, especially those, as I was once myself, who have the common view of professional academic historians as dedicated, honourable people. My experience has shown that to be a travesty, a fundamental error, which will make this sort of work, for anyone in future, just as difficult but prepared for it. It might help other investigators like me, with good, broad, education and idealism, who set out on this kind of path: devoting great energy for years to solve problems taken to be insoluble by the history profession. My position is, I believe, unique. I have spent thirty years solving these problems. Within two years, I had realised that the Scots were all on foot at the battle and reported it in an article in Quill in 1993 ISBN 0952191008. I had been researching for stories, plays and books about the battle and the time. While writing **The Bannockburn Years** in 1996, (which won the Constable Trophy in 1997 and was published in 1998 by Luath) I found the history in a mess. From the reaction of historians, I saw I had a duty to try and clear up the mess. My education and experience, being very different, might make it possible. Philosophy and mathematical science are full of problem solving; psychology, about human behaviour. I thought a couple of years away from novels would be enough. Because of the obstruction, it has taken all the years since. A full time event, most of the hours of the day, with nothing else in mind. So there is a lot about the psychology and obstruction of the academics who could not solve the problems and detested the fact that I was succeeding where they, because of their prejudices and basic lack of the necessary insight, had been content to make no progress. It must have been a great shock to Barrow and Duncan when they saw how far I had taken the subject in ***Bannockburn Revealed***. It is not the usual simple narrative of derring do, but chapter after chapter of arguments, even rating of arguments and the first attempt to produce a justified map, and collect all the chronicles and get them translated, all important firsts. All these photos of the pools in the Carse must have given them a few sleepless nights. Seeing some of their errors shot to pieces by one who had taught philosophy would have been distressing, unused as they were to be challenged or corrected. Not done in the culture they had created around them. And I was independent, out with control. If only they had known just how far the subject would be taken... If a publisher could have been found, it might have helped to overcome the burial. But in 1999, publishers did not expect anything new to be found, especially from an unknown, formerly publishing many articles about mathematics, education and philosophy, not known for history. The best I can hope for is that those like me in the future will be obstructed less and this reaction (of mine) might even discourage (a little) the current snobbish and very stupid attitude to outsiders. I think it was wise not to do a Phd in the subject. I had nothing to gain and much to lose. I knew right at the beginning that it was best to stay out of the history community in which I had observed confusion, prejudice and no progress. Isolation was essential. But I could not have found the fees and also done the work which was expensive. My integrity, work ethic and experience needed no help. The money would have been wasted. I had nothing to learn from any of them. I have had much to teach (though few, so far, have learned anything). The people best qualified to solve difficult problems are the outsiders who alone have open minds, rigorous

systems of work and a track record of published, educated insight. The idealist gives the task, all he has, everything in himself. His duty to his country and its people to find the truth is paramount.

2. Here is a list of things proved in Bannock burn Revealed (BR) in the year 2000:

On BR p254

1. No Scottish cavalry were deployed in the main battle. Every Scot was on foot. The proof is in the table of results of the analysis of each of the written reports of the battle cited and counted, statement by statement, just before this page. **There are 20 statements from 6 sources which say that there was no Scottish cavalry.** Three sources date from 1314, as shown in BR Ch 7 [There is a fourth]. The other three date from before 1341. Against this is **a single source, by John Barbour** (author of *The Bruce*), which makes 9 statements, all of which date from **1377** or soon after.

Why is that a proof?

Because anyone (who is not an idiot) should be compelled by its conclusion. How could a man, John Barbour, writing 63 years after the battle, be correct, when three sources, written days after it in 1314 and three others within twenty years, all agree that all the Scots were on foot? [There is another also in 1314] Moreover, all six are English sources, who alone could see the Scots approach. All of this makes it certain. No 14th century chronicle sources contradict this.

This is a hugely important advance, the first since the 14th century. That Bruce dismounted his cavalry, fought the main battle on foot, invites the important question: Why? That question is the key that unlocks the battle and historians Barrow, Duncan, Watson, Cowan et al, never asked the question and made no progress because of it. All they had to do, and it should have been done centuries ago, was to translate all the sources, print them all in one book and analyse them there, statement by statement and tabulate the results. When six sources, half of them written within days of the battle, most of them English (who alone could see the Scots approach) say, repeatedly, that the Scots were all on foot, against a single Scottish source, who was not present, unlikely to be born until many years after the battle (he died 1395ⁱⁱ), it is a simple fact: **the Scots all fought on foot.** The matter is proved beyond any shadow of doubt. They could not do it. They did not have all the sources translated. Trokelowe and Le Baker were first translated in BR in the year 2000. How could they expect to understand the battle without all the chronicle sources? Because they all believed that nothing could be proved about the battle. Thus there was no point in collecting and translating all the sources, still less, printing them all together in one book where they could be analysed. That is a phenomenal, repeated, act of stupidity. A disaster for the country and it lasted seven centuries. The history is all wrong, nothing of value is known about it and the battle area has been built up in places that should have been protected: a huge building erected in 2010 within 25 yards of the place where Bruce killed de Bohun, others nearby beside the road of 1314.

They also believed the ground was too much changed to be able to draw a map of the battle area in 1314.ⁱⁱⁱ Nonsense! The job has been done. It took years of labour but a fully justified map was made and confirmed by many able people, so that the entire matter can be resolved. All the books of this research have maps and they are all fully justified (in a volume of book length in BR,BP,GB). The maps on this website are the latest and the fewest: 8 stages when the others have 12. Why has the history community had nothing to say about this justified map? They did not believe it could be done. They were too lazy and they had no idea how to do it. They have not read it because they are not used to doing anything like that properly, provably. The effort necessary is unusual. Sour grapes rules. They would rather it had never been done, for it shows up their poor scholarship. Does that seem harsh? That is a small fraction of their collective ineptitude. Wait and see. Read the other articles on this website. The one thing guaranteed from the community is that it will bury and ignore anything which shows them up. 'You do not get to play with us because you are not mediocre enough. So we don't like you. If you are cleverer than us, we will never admit it. We care only about ourselves, will tell any lie, do anything to protect or advance ourselves.' That is who they are.

A corollary is that their failure to refer to it and admit it, means that they have selfish and disreputable reasons for their refusal to do so. Since this one conclusion is instrumental in the discovery of where the battle was fought and how won, it is a matter of intense interest to the entire Scottish population, for their very identity as Scots is involved, as well as the preservation and celebration of the events. Their refusal to admit the established facts is an immoral act. A further corollary is that since all four have failed in this way [all the underlings too, required by them to do so], the culture of the Scottish History Community can be seen to be a refusal to respond to challenge from original researchers except by burying their work to save face: denying publication of papers, books, reviews in history journals, all of which have occurred. It means that medieval history professors routinely tell lies to prevent important new discoveries becoming public knowledge to protect their own errors because all they were capable of was speculation. This culture means progress in Scottish Medieval History is impossible. the subject is moribund: the same drivel from centuries past being regurgitated down the ages without modification. This is certain because the ones mentioned have not changed their view of Bannockburn since John Barbour wrote in the 14th century, regarded as holy writ when, as shown in BR, he is only reliable when confirmed by an independent source written within days of it.

A further consequence is that the new professors, who are appointed on the say so of those in control, will be chosen because they are no threat to those in control. This means that mediocrity begets mediocrity. Anyone who discovers anything and goes to the press to announce it has the following experience: the press go to the professors in control of the subject and ask them their opinion. If it is original, it will necessarily conflict with what they believe and involve the overturn of their 'work' such as it is. Of course they tell

lies, even though it is obvious to anyone who gets to read it and they get away with it because the press assumes that the historians know better than anyone. **The press, especially in Scotland now, has virtually no investigative reporting. They can be got to read nothing.** They stupidly assume that the professors will be honest. Think for a moment! Go and look at the two diabolical errors by Professor Barrow exposed and condemned. GB p186, p197. Then read p168-et seq. That is the second error. The first, outright, deliberate, dishonesty is exposed on GB p160, 161 et seq. And then say that Barrow would have admitted his mistakes. He refused. He would never admit his mistakes, like Duncan. What he wanted was all the copies of GB (about 300) out of Oxfam shops where they were making £5 each for charity, donated free by me. He tried to save his reputation by rubbishing the book that found the truth. He succeeded: told whatever lies were necessary to achieve it. The assumption of his authority by Oxfam meant they believed him and ignored the outsider who had overturned Barrow's 'work' and solved the problems for the first time that Barrow believed impossible of solution. The combination of the gravitas of historians, presumed to be experts [when they are completely ignorant of the subject (Bannockburn) and incompetent to deal with it because they are not clever enough to know how to proceed] and the assumptions of the public and editors that they **are** experts is fatal to progress in Scottish Medieval History.

The culture of not allowing their errors to be challenged and telling lies to support it enables their error-ridden speculations to reign supreme. **The Scottish Medieval History group [Bannockburn Group, at least] is not a collegiate society for the discovery and propagation of the truth about our history. It is a protection racket to bury the work of anyone who discovers and tells the truth about it!** If you have read the other articles on this website, you might notice that what I am saying is correct. Why did no historian in the last fifty years ever point to all these errors I have pointed out and shown? There are lots of mistakes! They are all howlers! They all had a duty to do so! Why has no progress been made in the subject, Bannockburn, in seven centuries?

Note: Publishers are just as utterly useless as newspapers. Luath would not publish a history book of mine [Bruce's Genius Battle (BGB)] without the approval of historians like Barrow who had everything to lose by doing so. Stupidity is the norm. Any publisher who is ever faced with something different, that reaches different conclusions, needs to exercise his own intelligence and not depend on the 'authorities' who are bound to rubbish it to save face: they want to continue to be the 'experts'. The Truth is the last thing they want, since they could never find it. Publishers like Luath are just not intelligent enough, like newspaper editors, to realise that applying to a history professor that new work is of value is a fundamental error: if it is new, it contradicts the 'work' of the professor (even if he has done no real work as here). **Of course he will tell lies about its worth: rubbish it, to save his own face and his own 'work'.**

[2.1 The Scottish History Community (Bannockburn Group) has made no progress in seven centuries.

Duncan wrote to me in the 1990s that 'everyone believes' 6,000 Scots beat 20,000 English at Bannock burn because of a cavalry charge of Scots that chased the English archers from the field and an army of Small Folk, [Bk XI 425-435] taken by the English to be a reserve army entering the fray, causing flight. Watson's report on the battle 2001, continued this as did the Classic Edition of Barrow's Robert Bruce, in 2013, the fifth edition (said to be 'corrected' twice) since the first in 1965. So Barrow's opinion had never changed in over half a century. The subject had not advanced since Archdeacon Barbour in the 14th century. Duncan, Watson and Barrow all agree on that. Duncan translated Barbour in 1998, swallowed the lot reverently. Barrow in 2013, Robert Bruce (Classic Edition) his last book, had changed nothing. See p296: still a Scottish cavalry charge by Keith was sent to 'scatter the archers'. **Still, the battle is on the Dryfield**, p293 line 29. Still, Bannockburn is a place, p280. [It is not even a place in 1750 when Roy shows it or Jefferys in 1746!] The error in saying: 'None of the three best sources mention the battle by name' [Barrow, p215, 3rd ed, 281, 4th and Classic ed. ; BR p85], is still there! On p281. **They all do more than once**. There are still four brigades on p283, not three as seen on BR p254 in the year 2000. Only Barbour has four. **Every other source saw three**. Only an idiot or a block of stone could miss that. The evidence is utterly compelling: nobody saw four. The Scots still number 6,000 fighters Classic ed. p273 line 21. The Scots are still believed to be about a third of the English, because Barbour says so on Barrow p272 note 30 : 100,000 to 30,000: 3:1: about **20,000 then to 6,000**. Barbour is still translated as saying 'The English camped in the Carse because of the streams (pows)'. p289: quote at foot of page. **He has still forgotten Livilands Bog** p286/87. Bartholomews map shows it as 700 yards by 200 yards. **They learned nothing!** And yet, what they should have learned was proved, justified incontrovertibly in BR, BP and GB and they read them (said so and would have).

Watson, commissioned by Stirling Council, to determine the site, set out to form a consensus, (the best she could do) published in 2001, following Barrow completely. **None of them knew anything and they were never going to find out**. What is the point of appointing professors who have no aptitude for advancing the subject? Cowan was just as bad. His booklet in the Scotsman c2007 was the same drivel as the others listed above: as if John Barbour was still the authority after seven centuries. And he had been required to read BP as judge in the Saltire Research Award, but failed to do so. But all the others are just as bad. If they do not ask intelligent questions instinctively and follow through, no wonder they make no progress and are useless. If they cannot understand that effective counter arguments to what they believe have been made, they have closed minds, incapable of learning, of advancing the subject. Take candidates to some place they know nothing about and see how they respond. Can they understand it? These four would make no progress. That is why they failed. Why are hefty salaries being paid

to professors who are useless? They let the country down. Those who appointed them let the country down. The present lot will appoint others like them and they will let the country down because that alone secures their own reputation, all they care about. 'What we say goes, no matter what you have proved. We are the experts, for we have the titles and the power, the people believe in us and pay us £100,000 a year.' My reply? 'You have let our country down. You are lazy, incompetent, mistaken and learned nothing. All you care about is yourselves. Not the country or its people. You have proved nothing. I have proved everything that matters.']

P254 BR (and foregoing pages of reports, analysed, statements pro and con counted) **therefore gives a proof that the Scots all fought on foot. The matter is not disputable. It is quite certain.** Also BR p 211 et prior. [Some results on p254, come from p211 and accounting in Ch15]

2. The site of Battle is shown, in BR p254, to be The Carse of Balquhiderock: three sources make 13 statements (8+5) that show this. See BR p170 for the notation. B means Carse of Balquhiderock. Note: no sources contradict this. All the best sources have been examined carefully and analysed in BR. Also, the only sources with any useable detail are those that occur in the 14th century. All the others have no detail whatever. Even so, after fifty years of the battle, almost every source says practically nothing at all. Thus they have only a short paragraph, at most. All the best sources have several pages of detail. The one exception allowed in BR is Barbour's Bruce because it has a great deal of detail and is revered by some. Why did Barbour get it wrong about a Scottish cavalry charge chasing the English archers from the field? Because he could not understand how the Scots had won! He expected there to be Scottish cavalry and he invented the role they played. For centuries, this Scottish cavalry charge was believed because historians were too stupid to see that 500 Scottish light cavalry would have been shot flat by a blizzard of arrows long before they got near the English lines. He also invented a regiment of Small Folk **waving sheets** [BkXIII 236: 225-240 p491], who terrified the English into retreat, as if a reserve army. Note: 3 sources in BR in the year 2000, reveal that the Carse is the site of battle. In the proofs given below twenty years later, after massive research work, involving the ground, the old maps, deeper investigation of chronicles, correcting and proving translations, consulting long term residents of places, improved procedures, more and deeper insights, the number of chronicle sources supporting the conclusion is nine. With none against, as before. So there has been progress in this one issue by me alone. But the conclusion was available twenty years ago and it was correct in BR. It should have been used ever since, instead of being buried because inconvenient to those in control.
3. Small Folk waving sheets played no role in the battle. None of the nine sources mention them at all. Only Barbour. Go and look! BR p254. Yet nearly all were English sources who, if anyone saw them waving sheets, should have done so. In fact, anyone who knows the ground (as few historians do),

realises that an army of Small folk could not have been seen at all, no matter where they were placed. Woodland made it impossible. [Only historians could think woodland is a modern invention] Note: It is grossly offensive to any able mind (and Scotland is full of them!) that our historians never once asked the question: who saw the Small Folk? The answer is: nobody! Not one of the sources of any value, no sources whatever, have agreed with Barbour. That means he invented it. Why? Because he could not understand the victory. Well, we all do now. This website and all these books prove it.

4. English Morale before the main battle was very high: 57 statements from 7 sources say this. Only one, Scalacronica, disagrees. [That one source against, is of great interest later. There is a reason, we will find it and it tells us something important about Bruce as a commander. Any discontinuity of this kind, in a rigorous investigation, is of massive significance, as will be seen, twelve years later in GB]
5. The Charisma-Population Argument is a proof that Scottish Numbers were at least twice and probably thrice as great as historians have believed for centuries. ie The numbers in the battle were about equal. BR p157-158, p266-267, rated alpha plus: a proof: impossible to be otherwise. [It is repeated in BP and GB]. That historians have never in twenty years understood the force of this argument says a lot about their mental aptitude for the work.
6. BR p327: Brut y Tywysogyon [1314]: the battle of Bannock burn took place among pools of water. [GB p 159 shows a copy of the page]. BR plate 14a to 19 and 33a and b, show the pools.
7. BR p350: Barbour Bk12 392-395: The English camped in the Carse (on 23rd June 1314)...for in the Carse there were pools (of water). See the photos of the pools ibid.
8. **These two facts tell us that the battle took place in the Carse. BR p350-359. That is a basic foundation, sufficient in itself, of any proof of the battle site.** [There is a further fact GB P146: the Carse is unique in having pools of water regularly after heavy rain. Why this is so, is explained there.]
9. The Road that was defended: went across Milton Ford, the only place on the burn that could be crossed for a mile up and downstream because of steep escarpments, banks over 6ft on one side or the other and trees on both sides. p359-366-368. Since there was no bridge across until 1516, the one Ford was the only way across the burn in 1314. Was there a Roman bridge? No sign of one at any time. If there ever was one, it was wooden and temporary because the Romans left after a few years by c158 AD, confining themselves behind Antonine's Wall that goes through Falkirk, to the south. The road of 1314 from Falkirk bent right to reach the Ford, then right, then left up the escarpment and then, later, right to reach the straight again, along St Ninians Main Street past the Kirk built beside it in 1242 and straight on to Stirling Castle. The road across the Ford had to join up with St Ninians Main Street which existed in 1242 because the Kirk was built on it then. **Note: there was no other road north and south from Falkirk through St Ninians to Stirling until 1930.** [Any minor issues have been resolved elsewhere on this website even.]
10. Bruce defended the North Bank and slew de Bohun there. Obvious. QED

11. The Dryfield was a natural fortress which needed no defence except at the Ford BR p388-389. See the numerous photos in BR. Go and look! More in BP, GB.
12. There were pools in the Carse on June 23rd and 24th 1314: plate 14a,b-19a; 33a,b. BR, BP, GB all have many photos of the pools, some of them aerial, showing the road across the Carse having to zigzag to get round them, on every map back to Roy's (1750) and including it. Barbour says so [Bk 12 line 395, p467]. Brut y Tywysogyon says so in 1314 [Peniarth MS 20 p123]
13. Bannock burn was not a village in 1750. Three houses 150 yards apart, one of them down a steep hill by the burn in another world, do not make a village. **The village was half a mile south of the burn at Newmarket where there are a dozen houses on either side of the street.** The Stirlingshire map of General Roy, FRS, is brilliant, fully compatible with the first Ordnance Survey map surveyed 1860, published 1865. See BR plate 30b after p 408. The battle took its name from the burn not the place, there was no place in 1314.
14. The line of the main Pelstream is determined on BR p402-403. [photos on GB p96, p102 no 31 and p108 no 41 and BGB p176 and BS (Bannockburn Settled) p40.
15. The translation of pulis in Barbour should be pools, not streams. BR p 382 last three lines and first three of p383. BR 381, 382: polles = pools.

All these things were proved irrefutably in Bannock burn Revealed in the year 2000. There are others. These were all huge advances in the subject. All these proofs have been improved, extended and added to in the later books.

3. Reaction

Why were no reviews of it given in Scottish History Journals, (except Scottish local History in 2006, six years later, which was highly favourable)? Because errors of historians in control had been exposed and proved, against the culture. They could not admit their mistakes. They could not say anything in praise of the first book to make any progress in seven centuries. Sour grapes reigned over all. The discovered truth was too dangerous to make public. They would have lost face. That was more important to them than the truth. This means that as scholars they were **all defective**: they put themselves and how they were perceived, above the discovery of the truth and its dissemination to the people of Scotland.

There were other things that are important developments.

The idea of collecting **all** the written reports of the event, getting them translated and printing them **all** in a single volume where they can be analysed simultaneously and the results of counting statements pro and con **any issue**. That is a first and it is decisive. The fact that there was no Scottish cavalry in the main battle is immediate, the first time in seven centuries any historian realised it and proved it.

3.1 Dating sources

A second novel procedure was using the work of Sir F.C. Bartlett, F.R.S., with Cambridge undergraduates to validate the dates of sources. His experiments showed how successive repetitions of a story are affected. Omissions,

transpositions, conflations, inventions, to cover information lost and repetitions because of grief. After a few repetitions the story is different; after seven it is unrecognisable. With experience, these can be used to see when sources should count from. The date of first publication is often a mistake. The work on Bannockburn in **Vita** Edwardi Secundi, for example, is shown in BR to be in 1314, probably within days of the event, because of the grief shown, the battle was fresh in the mind of the author. The writing was earlier than 1315 because he was an escheator required and empowered to decide the legitimacy of his unborn heir and the fate of the Earl's five earldoms after his death in the battle. This is clear from what follows the writing on Bannockburn. The book was first published in 1325. Proving that Vita deserved to be dated 1314 was an important first. It meant that the source was one of the best there is. See BR Ch6 p56-59.

Another example is **Scalacronica** [BR p186-191] which was first written down in 1355 in Edinburgh Castle. However, the work on Bannockburn in it has full quotations, unlike almost everything else. These are alive, vivid and fit the circumstances precisely. Why? Because Sir Thomas Gray senior, the author's father, was captured on the first day of battle by Randolph's schiltrom and taken prisoner. On ransom, he would have met and talked to his son about it. Not once but often, going over it trying to understand the reason for the defeat which none of the English ever did. That is where the vivid descriptions and actual words spoken come from. They were carved on the memory of the father and soon in his son's. To this couple of knights that was the most important event of their lives. Of course they remembered it vividly, in detail. It should count from 1314. He may even have written to others about it at the time. [The age of the son is computed in the books. BR p61, BP p24, footnote 56, p27, footnote 66, GB p56-58].

Lanercost [BRp179-186] is 1314 because the report is made by one of the English or Welshmen on his way home just after the battle. He is probably Sir Ingram Umphraville for he knows, as hardly anyone else would know and no other available source, that the bounding streams of the Carse are tidal, the Bannockburn definitely, the Pelstream also definitely, for Kersemill was after 1459 [Miller, 1931, p9] (the drop at the junction today was probably manufactured later to increase the speed of the mill race). That is, because he owned lands at Dunnipace, just a few miles to the south west and would have known the district.

Trokelowe [BR p191-195] is one of the best sources, so detailed that he had to be present, 1314 then, and positioned on the south side of the Knoll where he could see Gloucester's desperate attempt to deflect the Scots from getting really close to the English Cavalry lines by driving at Douglas, leading his men forward; an action he misjudged as blood lust. Trokelowe's description of the advance of the Scots is the best there is: armed with shields, axes and pikes (essential: 'other weapons of war'). **How scandalous that in seven centuries this excellent source had never been translated in any book until it is in *Bannockburn Revealed* where it can be analysed. No wonder they could not solve the problems!** Trokelowe says **five times** that the Scots were all on foot, led by their King, on foot. How important all of that is! How could the battle be understood without it? How could Barrow explain that omission? **It is a stupendous mistake.** [Vita 52 agrees with Trokelowe 84 about the

Scots having axes] Faced with that single fact, to persist in the idea that a Scottish cavalry charge was a prime factor in the English defeat for half a century, is a huge disgrace. But nothing, besides some of his others.

Geoffrey Le Baker [BR p 63-65; 195-199], is another that surfaced for the first time in *Bannockburn Revealed*. **Never before translated in any book!** There is a lot of detail in the source. He too repeats the fact that the Scots were all on foot, unequivocally: **they were all forbidden to mount a warhorse**, p196. That sort of statement is vital to understanding the battle. So also is what he reveals about the 'Wassail and Drinkhail' the night before the battle by all the overconfident English (Baston does too, 1314, present at the battle). The English archers too, are revealed. Some shot their own knights in the back. And would have stopped shooting, hearing the cries. Others shot in a high parabola, whose arrows bounced off the helmets of the Scots. These tell us that the Scots were kneeling and the English archers had to get over the heads of their own knights on tall horses to have any hope of reaching the Scots. No wonder the English archers failed: how could they see kneeling men over the heads of six foot men on six foot high horses? Impossible. Baker's Latin is not ideal but it does make perfect sense. How awful that no historian ever saw this and made use of it! How obscene that Barrow and Duncan had nothing to say in praise of these two sources and their value when they first appeared in BR in the year 2000. That is shameful! What petty minded, stupid and utterly selfish people they were! To deprive the People of Scotland of the truth to save their faces is a disaster! And since they died, other historians, the ones that got jobs from their patronage, have had nothing to say either. Another disaster. Conflation in Baker (two days of battle into one; the ditch (the Bannock burn) conflated with the pottes (which would have been on the S side of the burn to deter Englishmen at the rear of the column blocked at Milton Ford, from outflanking to the west where there is a gap between the bogs) needs to be managed. But you do not give up on a chronicle source just because the author has forgotten some things or transposed some events or conflated the pottes and the Bannockburn which is to be expected when years have passed. There is still gold dust to be mined in them. They provide the clues that make the full understanding of the battle possible. Taken to be 1341- in BR p64.^{iv}

Baston and Brut y Tywysogyon are both 1314, the latter has the date in the quotation. Baston, who is known to have been so confident of an English victory that he wrote his poem before the battle started, had to rewrite it when captured by the Scots. 20 to 23 in Bk XII Vol VI Scotichronicon are verses about Bannockburn, the last by Baston, two others unknown but the same vintage. See Prof Watt on xv -xviii.

3.2 Masterstrokes Four are given in BR (published 2000): p286

1 The initial defensive position: Milton Ford. They had to cross the burn. The Ford is the only place. Since no historian in seven centuries has ever understood this, of course it is a phenomenal insight! Any historian between 1314 and 1750 should have known where the defence of the Castle (and therefore the death of de Bohun) was made. The Ford was still used till the 18th century. See Roy's maps of Stirlingshire.

2 The decision to leave the defensive position of day 1, The Dryfield, early on day 2, march all the Scots across to the entry to the Carse and pen the English within their encampment. That was an idea of genius! Who would have imagined that the Scots would leave their excellent defensive position on the Dryfield, a natural fortress, and **march, everyone on foot**, onto the Carse and across it right up to the English lines? Genius!

3 The decision to get as close as possible to the English to close down the space available for their cavalry to get up speed. That is why Bruce had to lead the entire army on foot across the Carse: to make the decision where to set the pikes. There is the start of it on p44-45 BR.

4 The decision to dismount his own cavalry: put everyone on foot. To Barbour that was unimaginable! For the history community, for seven centuries, it occurred to none of them that such a thing was possible.

3.3 Degrees of Confidence of things proved. Five out of eleven are 99% certain. Proofs, then. Why only 99%? On the off chance that some other source might turn up. In twenty years it never has. If one ever did, it would almost certainly confirm those already seen.

There is an entire chapter (Ch 23) describing the battle p418-437.

What reasons were given for BR not to be accepted for review by SHR etc? None. The people wrote nothing down. They had to know that the reason was that it would adversely affect the reputations of those in authority. Correcting their errors was not done. They just would not say anything. The History Community was a closed shop and I was not admitted. [The qualification for admission is to be more mediocre than those in control]. The passage of time has shown that progress will never be made so long as it is a closed shop. Only an outsider not subject to the prejudices of the past and the present (worse), with a different education, providing open mindedness and a bent for original thinking, can make progress. My mathematical science, philosophy and psychology were instrumental in my success. I took university classes and summer schools in classics (I had done Latin at school) and taught myself cartography. My frustration was immense. I could see the value of BR, knew that it had broken new ground, transformed the subject. The 100 pages of Topographical investigation in BR which justified the map were invaluable, completely unprecedented, like all the arguments which were carefully rated. Who before, ever realised that a map of an event centuries ago should be justified: every detail explained and established? It took labour and time and expense. The idea of showing not one map but twelve to describe the stages of the battle was invaluable. The battle field was visited for that first book at least a hundred times (whole days) to understand how it had changed. The next two books increased that number five fold over the next dozen years, nearly all of it full time.

3.4 The error Duncan could not admit. Ch 10 BR. The argument that showed Duncan's paper *War of the Scots* was based on a mistake: the failure to get the letter of 28th November 1313 by Edward 11 translated from Latin, relying instead on a summary by Bain, and missing the date 24th June 1314, meant that the truce was a

year and not the 3 months Duncan had argued in *War of the Scots*. Duncan never contacted me about this, never corrected his paper. Students still believed his paper to be correct and said so in the books they wrote. How can this be explained? **It is phenomenally** immoral! To act as if your 'work' is correct, after it has been disproved, a heinous disgrace. **Professors** Duncan and Barrow were prepared to sit on their mistakes like hens and act as if the eggs had not been burst wide open: smashed to bits. And without that, progress was impossible. The mistakes had to be got out of the literature. What mediocre minds these were to act as if they were correct, having been proved to be wrong! Notice the absurd contradiction: the people in control do not allow challenge and when it is made and is successful, they act as if it never took place. BR 115-128 explains Duncan's error with translations of the letter he could never provide for himself.

3.5 Barrows errors: Notice the fundamental problem that bedevilled the Scottish Historians. The belief that the problems could not be solved. Stated several times to me by Professor Barrow, as if it were an immutable truth; and he a God uttering it from Olympus. You will never do it, said he 'It cannot be done'. And this was long after I had published BR! In which I had already proved a page full of things, never imagined before. The list of things above.

I was disgusted by his attitude. My insight, of which I had given him (and others) already remarkable proof, time after time, was offended. My education, the education I had even been providing for many years, approved mightily by the Master of a Cambridge College and a professor at Aberdeen, was devoted to the idea that the world was discoverable. Things could be discovered with sufficient effort and insight and proved to be the case— irrefutably. I did not try and convert him to my point of view which, as a teacher of philosophy and mathematical science, in many other spheres I would have done instinctively. It was so obviously futile in his case. Deaf and blind.

He was still acting like this after I published **Bannock burn Proved** (BP). This he would have read for sure (because he read BR and GB). And there he would have seen all the proofs therein. There is the one sentence proof on pxxv followed by a second level of proof on the next three pages. There are 12 maps in full colour that are fully justified and show the pools of water (the main ones) and all the elevations and ridges and bogs that Roy drew so magnificently and Livilands, shown so excellently by Miller in the map for his 1931 paper made by Bartholomew, a beautiful map. These 12 maps are referenced. They constitute a proof of a visual kind. But there are three other detailed proofs in BP. There is nothing in Scottish History like them. They occupy many pages and are utterly compelling. How was it possible for Barrow not to be affected by these? It is an act of very surprising stupidity not to see the value of all that. You prove the result wanted by using all the available sources to show the individual conclusions that together produce the final conclusion: that the battle was fought in the Carse. An invaluable procedure. Mathematical proofs often have this structure.

There were, over the years, several letters to me from Barrow. None of them ever dealt with the proofs in BR,BP,GB. He once, late on, went so far as to give a trifling

reason for no battle in the Carse (and on the Dryfield which he still preferred: the presence of all these sharp ridges and deep depressions on the Dryfield did nothing to dissuade him from siting the battle there!). But refusing at the outset to engage in discussion. It had to do with Barbour's mention of sykes in the Carse. These he took to be streams. Instead, the sykes would be the bounding streams that constituted the limits of the Carse. No map has ever shown streams within the Carse itself.^v That Barrow was content with a statement by Barbour at all, made in 1377, as having any status whatever, when so many things had been proved by BR, BP and GB, including that Barbour was not a reliable source for anything unless supported by another much earlier, is very hard to understand. Stupidity and obtuseness in scholarship is surely a subject worthy of study, it is so inconvenient to the pursuit of knowledge. University heads should be got to read this. It matters!

Barrow's errors shown in BR? Believing Bannockburn was a village in 1314 when it was not even a place in 1750, as Roy's brilliant map shows. BR plate 30b after p408. The village is at Newmarket. Three houses, 150 yards apart, one of them down a severe slope in another world, do not make a village. Forgetting Balquhiderock Wood on his map: no woodland anywhere, as if it is a modern invention. BR p82. Mistakes in drawing the Pelstream which rises, not east of St Ninians but west in 12 springs on Gillies Hill; and with the line all wrong, between the streams: the strategic key to the battle. His map on p215 3rd and p270 4th edition has five gaps where no gaps should be as shown 9 pages further on, a very serious error (a hanging offence) BR p160 [there are 5 gaps which make the map look as if it is an area of streams (for which he is arguing): it isn't] See GB 160-161. Forgetting Livilands Bog (about 200 yards by 700) which is in the map made for Miller in his paper of 1931 by Bartholomews; BR p85, Barrow p215 3rd ed: saying that 'none of our best chronicle sources Vita, Lanercost and Scalacronica, even Barbour, refers to the battle by name.' Except Vita, four of them do: Bannockburn. Scalacronica twice, Lanercost three times, Trokelowe and Bridlington and even Barbour, five times. BR p87 - p91. Even Vita knew it took its name from the stream and called it a ditch. He just did not know the name. The others do and could have told him. Barrow never made any move to change that error. Yet, the cover of BR has a page from Scalacronica with Bannockburn and Robert the Bruce on the front. Barrow misunderstood the line of the Pelstream, fatally missing the short distance across the Carse which makes imprisoning the enemy, the one strategic move of genius that made victory possible, for those with imagination to see it. In twenty years, Barrow's chief error in BR is misunderstanding Roy's maps. He thought shading meant high ground. Not so. If it were, Coxet Hill would be shaded on top, it isn't: only round the base. Just to the south east are two bands of shading with the slope across them both the same: parallel lines. Impossible if it is high ground: the slope would have to change. Shading is woodland. A lot of woodland is shown by Roy, as one expects. [Why Barrow should have thought woodland a modern invention is a mystery: he should have expected more of it as one goes back through the centuries, as it is on nearly every map, for obvious reasons.] Barrow's mistake is juvenile; failing to learn from it, insisting it was right, scholastically criminal. He gave that 'mistake' of mine, as he saw it, as the reason for refusing to support my election to FRHistS. That was the only thing he had to say about Bannockburn Revealed! How very revealing that

is! Consider the list of things proved in BR for the first time, and you see what an incompetent scholar Barrow was.

The first 18 pages of BP were written to persuade Barrow that there was woodland in the battle area in 1314 (which he denied. Not in his map 3rd Edn. pp205, 213. That is, for him, there was none; yet its presence near a battlefield is crucial, especially on a slope like Balqhiderock down to the Carse: about 70ft). These are full of photos of woodland now, even with 25,000 people in the area, and maps right back to Roy's which show lots of woodland, more and more as you go back in time (as expected). Barrow learned nothing from any of it. It is very important to realise this. Some professors are likely to be just as obtuse as Barrow was. What is peculiar about it is that Barrow never did understand that even work on Bannockburn has to have evidence to support it. A few references prove nothing, at least of the kind he gave. Most of his obiter dicta have no justification of any kind. Eg. That pow=stream. That 'Polmaise, Cockspow, Drypow, Powdrake, Powside, Powbridge, Pow Burn,' etc all refer to streams. Barrow, Robert Bruce, p212, 3rd edition, p270 4th. Barrow gives no evidence of any kind for any of this. The idea is ridiculous. The closest to 'pow' is pool, not stream, which has no connection. To have any possibility of being correct, there would have to be a reason for the linguistic change [The origin of pow is explained here on p59]. Late on, 1998, thirty three years after the first edition of his book, Barrow gave the idea that it comes from the distinction between P Celtic and Q Celtic. GB p413. However, there is no consensus even on what these are, still less, that there are any instances of them. See *Celtic from the West*, Prof Barry Cunliffe, Oxford et al. My method of disproving this involved visiting every single place, often more than once, some as often as eight or ten times, to understand and prove it fully: one by one, exhaustively. What was Barrow's citation of P&Q Celtic for? To answer possible objections. Making the kind of defensive noise, no more, that is habitual. The result was disastrous to his case. See GB p168-180. As if his errors shown on GB 160-162, are not bad enough. In *The Uses of Place-names and Scottish History*, Barrow has an article with two maps on p60,61; seen on GB p169,170. **These prove the exact opposite of what he imagines.** Almost every place is a decent fraction of a mile from the nearest stream which shows that water (an essential!) can only be got from a pool beside the place. Pol means pool.

I ask myself whether there was some way I could have got through to him, to get him to realise the extent of his failures of mind. I was of course angry at what I saw as his total refusal to embrace the quite ordinary ideals of open mindedness to new ideas no matter how inconvenient, the demand to prove everything to the fullest extent possible and the absolute fascination for the discovery of the truth, for that is what the intellectual life is about. I do not think this was so in his case. He was a man with a view of himself as an authority and never questioned whether his pronouncements were correct. I think that he had never understood what it is to seek for the truth about anything. What we (most of us) want to do is to understand an event like Bannockburn. Completely. He was content to know nothing at all about it and blame it on inadequate sources and too much change in the landscape. Neither was correct. Because he had taken that position, he was immune to any other viewpoint.

I decided that it was my duty to take the matter further and prove everything, if I could. It would mean years more of work at history, which had never been my intention. Quite a lot I had already proved in BR. I soon saw that I had to try and develop the idea of proof in an event like the Battle of Bannock burn. That first book (BR) took over two and half years to complete, working at it full time. Collecting papers from libraries, buying books, travelling (petrol! food) and photographing, thousands of prints which all had to be developed in those days. Expensive! And I had very little income, £500 a month, by the year 2,000, less ten years before. It was my duty: to try. I had no idea if I would succeed. I just thought I might.

4. Proofs

The First Proof in Bannock burn Proved (BP) p19- p67. Twenty five conclusions are proved, stated together on p64-67. The Theorem proved is that the main battle of Bannock burn was fought in the Carse of Balquhiderock.

The Second Proof in BP p83-p88. There are 18 subsidiary quotations from relevant sources and insights arising from these and the ground. Note: 67 coloured pages in BP with over 100 photos show the ground very clearly.

All of these are considered from the point of view of the philosophy of science, a subject I once taught. In each of BR, BP, GB.

The Third Proof of the site of the main battle in BP p133-136 (extended here)

The structure is to prove three propositions using the sources with explanations in a few places to explain misunderstandings by the observer or the scribe (in the case of Lanercost). Where there are conflation, confusions, inventions or irrelevancies to the issue, these will be excluded. The effect of all three is also considered. The translations here are correct. Pulis = pools [Prof Duncan is incorrect]; polles =pools [Prof Thomas Jones is correct]. This is proved in GB Ch VI. Some articles in the website show it very well. [Briefly, pulis is the plural of pul, in the 14th century. Barbour's Bruce is full of examples. Any Scot knows pul means pool. The photos alone in GB Ch VI are decisive. Clearly, this is an area of pools not streams. In fact, there are unusually few streams in this entire area of 3 corses, shown in GB p164-167. There are also corollaries which the culture of the current Scottish Medieval History (Bannockburn group) would never have been capable of in the future (like the rest of it). They add to the effect of the chronicle sources. They are necessary to explain the battle. The site is not enough. We need to understand the entire matter. It is worth the effort. Note: GB published in 2012 has several proofs which are different, of many things, including the site. They might be better than this in some ways.

5. A long Proof:

Proposition 1. The English camped in the Carse the night before the main battle.

Barbour's Bruce 1377: '[The English] camped in the Carse that night... for there were pools of water in the Carse.' [Bk 12 391-395, BR p240-241]

Brut y Tywysogyon 1314: '...on the eve of St John (23rd June 1314) at Midsummer. And on that day (June 24th) occurred the **encounter in the Pools**. And Gilbert the Younger, earl of Clare (Gloucester) and many of the men of England besides, were slain by the Scots. And the King of England ignominiously fled from that encounter.' [Peniarth [Ms20 p123, see a copy in GB 159] This is the Battle of Bannockburn. Note 1: Because of these two sources, the site of the main battle is already determined. For 2: only the Carse of Balquhiderock possesses many pools of water after heavy rain because it alone is an enclosed carse (between the bounding streams (Pelstream and Bannock) which has a high water table in consequence. Explained with a diagram in **GB p146 (an important source)**. In heavy rain, water cannot be absorbed. Thus it collects in the undulations in the flat ground, as many photos in BR, BP, GB of the Carse reveal. The other corses on either side are not enclosed, they end at the R. Forth 40 ft down which means water is absorbed easily for a distance as far as the bogs in each. Two great bogs occupy most of the other ground in them. Since the battle was fought among the pools, the English camped in the Carse and were fought there. [There never was a bog in the Carse, as Roy's map shows clearly. He shows the others with amazing detail four of them. Livilands alone is marked but missing because he was taken off the job then; sent to the continent]. We see that the English camped in the Carse according to this source.

Scalacronica 1314, Sir Thos. Gray 1314: 'The King's army which having already left the road through the wood [at Milton Ford] had debouched upon a plain [The Carse] near the Water of Forth beyond [north of] the Bannock burn, an evil deep wet marsh, where the English unharnessed and remained all night.' [Maxwell's trans, 54; BR p188]. It is not a marsh but flat ground with many pools of water, as the others above report, GB p146 explains, the many photos reveal and the ground has always shown in every map, because the road across the Carse zigzags around the pools. Gray was captured and only saw it briefly when crossing close to the wood. His son interpreted what he was told as a marsh. Not so. The Norman French may be inapt here. Pools are easily taken to be a marsh. The other sources tell us it was pools of water; and the ground (an important source in its own right) confirms it in fact and in many photos. The English camped in a flat plain near the Forth and beyond the Bannock burn. This is the Carse. They could not be further away: the English feared the Scots would escape them. Because of its pools and bounding streams it was an excellent camp site. p55 '[The Scots] at sunrise on the morrow marched out of the wood in three divisions of infantry. They directed their course boldly upon the English army... They [The English] **mounted in great alarm. [The English are in their camp which is in the Carse]**

Trokelowe 1314: 'This most deadly battle was fought near Stirling Castle at a moor (flat plain) near the Bannock burn.' Which plain several sources admit the English

crossed into and recrossed after the battle. [Annales p86, BR p193] The Carse is the flat plain near the Bannock burn. For example:

Lanercost 1314: ‘Another calamity which befell the English was that, whereas they had shortly before crossed a great ditch called the Bannock burn into which the tide flows and now wanted to recross it (after camping and being attacked in the morning); many nobles and others fell into it with their horses in the crush while others escaped with much difficulty and many were never able to extricate themselves from the ditch.’ [Maxwell’s trans. P208; BR p185] The English had crossed the Bannockburn the night before to camp and, the next day, were approached there, fought, and fled back across it.

Scotichronicon 1314: ‘The muddy Bannock holds those whose names we do not know...Between the stony stream and the obstruction of their camp the treacherous English people come to grief as a result of their own dishonest conduct.’ [Vol VI BK XII p359 line 61, 73-75]. Most Englishmen were killed between their camp in the Carse and the Bannock burn. So they camped in the Carse and were caught there early, unprepared and fought and lost there. p45 BP has most of these quotations, six of them.

All of these make perfect sense on the map of 1314 which has been fully justified and confirmed. The pools of water have been photographed in several occasions shown in BR, BP, GB, GS, BGB and Bannock burn: The Poem. They have been a factor since 1314 and before, shown by the zigzag road across the Carse, Millhall Rd, which could not be straight because of them; shown on every decent map including Roy’s, 1750. The pools have been stated by Barbour and Brut y Twysogyon to be present on 23rd and 24th June.

Because six sources, the best sources among them, confirm this result, the proper application of scientific method demands that this proposition is accepted as knowledge.

Proposition 2. The Scots occupied the Dryfield of Balquhiderock the night before the main battle.

All the best known authorities believe this already because the sources tell us the Scots camped in the New Park (Barbour BK XI, 360-380, p423), successfully defended the road to the Castle and repulsed the English the day before the main battle, Bruce being completely successful in defending the road to Stirling at Milton Ford. Had the English not been repulsed at the entry to the Dryfield, they would have occupied it and would never have had to camp in the Carse at all. The English could not penetrate the Dryfield because it is a natural fortress (shown by the hundreds of photos in BR, BP, GB) of sharp ridges and wide, depressions of 75 ft and 54ft as shown by the map. A cavalry charge on it, as the sources describe, was impossible. The entry to the Dryfield was at Milton Ford, the only way across in 1314 because there were no bridges till 1516. The Bannock burn was impassable for a mile up and downstream from the Ford because of steep escarpments (34ft just south of the Ford, 50ft and 64ft further down) on both sides of the burn. Note: had there been a bridge across the burn, Bruce would have burnt it, destroyed it, so that the Ford was

the only way across, as it was for a mile up and downstream from the road. Thus the defence of the Dryfield occurred at Milton Ford, the entry to the New Park which was therefore the place where Bruce slew de Bohun. [See the article: Errors of Historians herein]

Vita Edwardi Secundi [1314] p51: ‘On Sunday, which was the vigil of St John’s day, as they passed by a certain wood and were approaching Stirling Castle, the Scots were seen straggling under the trees as if in flight (scouts rushing back to tell the pikemen of the advance of the enemy), and a certain knight, Henry de Bohun pursued them...to the entrance of the wood. For he had in mind that if he found Robert Bruce there he would either kill him or carry him off captive. But when he had come thither, Robert himself came suddenly out... of the wood, and the said Henry, seeing that he could not resist the multitude of the Scots, turned his horse with the intention of regaining his companions; but Robert opposed him and struck him on the head with an axe that he carried in his hand. His squire, trying to protect or rescue his lord, was overwhelmed by the Scots.

‘This was the beginning of their troubles! On the same day a sharp action was fought, in which the earl of Gloucester was unhorsed (also at the Ford), and Robert de Clifford disgracefully routed (by Moray, near St Ninians), and many were killed on either side. The day being spent, the whole army met at the place where it was to bivouac that night.’ [This is the Carse, the best camp site for miles, with the pools and bounding streams, so useful in midsummer to an army eager to quench its thirst and one the English were accustomed to use in previous visits 1298, 1304 etc.]

Thus, the Scots defence was successful and the English went off to camp in the Carse as arranged, leaving the Scots in charge of the Dryfield. [Denholm-Young’s trans.]

Archdeacon Barbour [1377]: The Bruce: BkXI 438- 454, p427. [The Scots] stood all ranked in a line (not accurate: curved lines, several lines deep, leaving a space on the N bank: otherwise the English might have been put off crossing over the burn. Bruce wanted them to cross, leaving a space to make it easy! Then they would quickly get in each other’s way and the more that crossed, the more congested it would become, making manoeuvre impossible) ready to give hard battle if anyone wanted to attack them. The king [Bruce] had them all be ready for he knew for a certainty that his enemies lay all night at Falkirk, and then they held the way straight towards him with many men of great power. Therefore he ordered his nephew, the Earl of Moray with his following, to keep the road beside the Kirk, so that no man should pass that way to fight for the castle. **And he said that he himself would keep the entry** (to the New Park) **with his division**, if any wanted to attack there.’ The entry is Milton Ford. (Go and look; see the map.) So Moray defends the road to the Kirk and Bruce defends the road across the Ford. Douglas was to help whoever needed it: he occupied the centre on the highest point: 200ft from which he could see all around. Bruce kills de Bohun [Bk 12 25-86] BK 12 p453, line 83: The English were severely beaten and driven off (to camp in the Carse, Vita 51). Moray drove them off too, only one yeoman slain BK 12 151. Sir Edward Bruce commanded the Scottish right wing (by custom) and would have defended the gap in the bogs near today’s Chartershall. A move on the English left flank was therefore defended. [Bk 11

324] Thus, the Scots won the battles of the first day. **The Scots retained the Dryfield, therefore.**

Scalacronica [1314]: p52 'The said King of England came thither... where the said Constable Philip (Moubray) met him at three leagues from the castle....Then he told him how the enemy had blocked the narrow roads in the forest. [But] the young troops would by no means stop, but held their way. The advanced guard, whereof the Earl of Gloucester had command, entered the road within the Park, where they were immediately received roughly by the Scots who had occupied the passage (across the burn). Here Peris Mountforth (actually Sir Henry de Bohun) knight, was slain with an axe by the hand of Robert de Brus, as was reported. While the advanced guard were following this road, Robert Lord de Clifford and Henry de Beaumont, with three hundred men-at-arms, made a circuit upon the other side of the wood towards the castle, keeping open ground (in the Carse, then: open because flat and subject to many pools of water which rotted seedlings). Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray...hearing that his uncle (Robert Bruce) had repulsed the advanced guard of the English on the other side of the wood (at the Ford) issuing from the wood with his division marched across the open ground (on the plateau) towards the two afore-mentioned Lords. [The English had not seen Moray's force which were positioned on the hill up to St Ninians for the woodland on it (Pelstream Woods, S side). Stopped by Livilands Bog, the English found a path up onto the plateau [There is one]. Moray heard them go and, leaving half his force to protect the Scottish rear at the Ford, ran the other half along St Ninians Main Street past the Kirk. Sir Henry de Beaumont (hearing them coming) called to his men: 'Let us wait a little; let them come on; give them room! Note: From where he is placed, Douglas (at 200ft, highest on the Dryfield) can see where Moray makes a circle of his half schiltrom and defends it against the attacking English knights who charge as individuals. Sir William Deyncourt is killed, Sir Thomas Gray senior is captured] 'his horse killed on the pikes, and he himself carried off with them [The Scots] on foot when they marched off. Having utterly routed the squadron of the two Lords. Some of whom [the English] fled to the castle, others to the king's army which, having already left the road through the wood had debouched upon a plain near the water of Forth beyond Bannock burn, an evil, deep, wet marsh where the English army unharnessed and remained all night, having sadly lost confidence and being too much disaffected by the events of the day.' [Maxwell's trans. 53-54]. **NB** This is the crucial statement that tells how Bruce got his men to believe they could win. The idea that will soon come from Sir Alexander Seaton, a Scot, 'fighting' on the English side: **that they are all afraid of the Scots.** Not a chance! BR p254 shows 63 [43 +6 + 14] statements of High English Morale. Had they been afraid, they would not have spent the night in 'drinkhail and wassail' Le Baker 7; Baston (Scotichronicon Vol VI Bk XII p309 76-78). They were overconfident! How could they be anything else? They had six times as many cavalry, better mounted, trained and experienced. They did not believe they needed anything else! Seaton is induced by Bruce to pretend to cross over and say that the English are afraid. Probably, he arrived late and was caught by chance, or thought better of it. **Every other statement reveals immense overconfidence among the English.** The idea that they could lose would have been a joke. A foxhunt of Scottish peasants was in prospect. Seaton could not

have crossed over without being seen by Englishmen. Had the Scots intended to flee before his arrival, they should have done so half a day before, to increase the distance between the two armies. Bruce never intended to flee. He knew he could win and do so easily, if he were careful not to provoke them. BR p254 shows the huge difference in the morale of the English as judged by Scalacronica and every other source. Sir Thomas Gray is a prisoner in the English camp. His son (author of Scalacronica) gets this story from his father soon after the battle. He got it from the men in Bruce's camp. That is where the discontinuity comes from: Bruce's men were told a lie and Gray senior heard it, believed it and told his son. For Scalacronica, the Scots won the battles of the first day. **Thus they remained in charge of the Dryfield.**

Trokelowe: [1314] 'Some of the English army, riding out in front of the Scots formations, challenged them ferociously but they, resisting manfully, killed many nobles on that Sunday viz the Vigil of the Nativity of St John the Baptist (23rd June). As a result, the English were exasperated and firmly resolved to be avenged or to be defeated on the following day.' [Annales p83; BR p191]. For Trokelowe, the Scots won the battles of the first day. **Thus, they remained in command of the Dryfield which they had successfully defended.**

Lanercost 1314: 'The Scots did not interfere until they [The English] were far ahead of the main body, when they showed themselves, and cutting off the king's advanced guard from the middle and rear columns, they..killed some of them and put the rest to flight.' [Maxwell's trans 207] **Thus, for Lanercost, the Scots won the battles of the first day and retained the Dryfield overnight.**

Five quotations from early sources on p134 give this, along with dozens of photos and a fully justified, confirmed, map of the area in 1314. The justification of the map is in BR, BP, GB. The confirmation is in the very able men who have done so in these books. The proper application of scientific method demands that this proposition be accepted as knowledge.

Proposition 3. The Scots advanced on the English in their camp in the Carse soon after dawn on the second day.

The Scots are on the Dryfield in their woods at the edge of the Carse. The English are drunk, singing and many asleep in their camp in the Carse around and on the Knoll. Vita (BR 176), Lanercost 207, Scalacronica (55, BR190), Trokelowe Annales (84 BR 191-5), Barbour (BR243) and Baston [Scotichronicon Vol VI BK XII 23 pp367-375] all describe a move by the Scots 'at sunrise', 'from far away'. from 'in their woods', which is 'sudden' and 'bold' and catches the English 'mounting in great alarm' Scalacronica, and their commanders - not with their troops - but arguing together with the King (on the Knoll BP 199-200; with the kinks in the mill lade in Roy's map to get round it; also on Jefferys map 1746 GB p74, 76) as the Scots approach [Vita BR p 176, Barbour BR p243] - and which catches them in their camp. Arguing in their camp. 'The Scots came in line of schiltroms and attacked the English columns which were jammed together' Scalacronica. The Brut y Tywysogyon tells of 'the battle among the pools'. And there are pools on this Carse uniquely, regularly, as Barbour says there are, on 23rd June 1314. Pools of water do not form on the

Dryfield which is so named because it is dry. What would it take to falsify these accounts? More than seven fresh and independent reports, written in the year of the battle, like most of these. If any were found they would almost certainly confirm those we already possess. Until this is overturned, if ever, the proper application of scientific method demands that this proposition be accepted as part of our knowledge.

Vita Edwardi Secundi 1314: P 52 'Robert Bruce...led his whole army out from the wood (Balquhiderock Wood). About forty thousand men he brought with him, and split them into three divisions;.. and not one of them was on horseback, but each was furnished with light armour...They had **axes** at their sides and carried (lances) pikes in their hands. They **advanced** like a thick-set hedge, and such a phalanx could not easily be broken... James Douglas..vigorously attacked the Earl of Gloucester's line. [**This means the Scots have left the Dryfield and are heading for the English in their camp: in the Carse**] The earl withstood him manfully, once and again penetrated their wedge, and would have been victorious if he had had faithful companions. But look! At a sudden rush of Scots, the earl's horse is killed and the earl rolls to the ground...of the five hundred cavalry whom he had led to the battle at his own expense, he almost alone was killed... p53 While Hereford and Gloucester disputed in this fashion, and the Scottish forces were approaching rapidly, the Earl of Gloucester dashed forward in disorder... When those with our king saw that the earl's line was broken and his men ready to run, they said it would be dangerous to tarry longer and safer for the king to retreat....p54 The king quitted the field and hastened towards the castle. Moreover, when the royal standard was seen to depart, the whole army quickly dispersed.... While our people fled, a certain ditch (the Bannock burn) entrapped many of them. [**They are in the Carse, retreating to the Bannock burn.**]

Thus, **the Scots advanced into the Carse**, took up a position close to the English cavalry lines and set their pikes right across the Carse, enclosing the English in a sheep pen made by the bounding streams, Pelstream and Bannock burn. Once they charged the Scots, successive waves piling into those ahead, doing no damage, they were unable to move forward, sideways or retreat due to the mass behind, the space being filled with infantry, archers and sight seers. [Denholm-Young's trans. Nelson, 1957]

Scalacronica 1314: p55 'At sunrise on the morrow [**The Scots**] marched out of the wood in three divisions of infantry. They directed their course boldly upon the English army [**The Scots are heading for the English in their camp in the Carse**]...They [The English] mounted in great alarm (they are in their camp), for they were not accustomed to fight on foot; whereas the Scots had taken a lesson from the Flemings, who had before that at Courtrai defeated on foot the power of France. The aforesaid Scots came in line of schiltroms and attacked the English columns, which were jammed together (because of the bounding streams) and could not operate against them [the Scots], so direfully were their horses impaled upon the pikes. p56 The troops in the English rear fell back upon the ditch of Bannock burn, tumbling one over the other.' [Maxwell's trans. Glasgow, 1907] Note: this is accurate: the Bannock burn goes around the Knoll and meets the Pelstream there. Thus the rear of the

English army would have fled into the burn all along the S Carse after the Great Bend to the junction with the Pelstream. **Thus the Scots have left the Dryfield and advanced upon the English, in their camp.**

One certainty is that the Scots set their pikes before the English charged. Another is that they set them very close to the English cavalry, who, unmounted, could not prevent it. Trokelowe makes this clear: having reached their desired position, The Scots waited for the English.

Trokelowe 1314: Annales, p84 '**Robert the Bruce, on foot with his entourage, went ahead of his whole army, so that..no one would think of running away [so the Scots have moved out of the Dryfield towards the English i.e. towards their camp which is in the Carse... Once in position) 'Emboldened, they [The Scots] awaited the arrival of the English without fear,** resolutely prepared to live or die, to conquer or be conquered, for the defence of their side, regarding their death in this event as martyrdom and their wounds as salvation. On their side, they were all on foot: picked men, very courageous, properly armed with very sharp **axes** and other weapons of war (pikes) with their shields tightly locked in front of them (shields and axes alone would not be enough: pikes are essential), forming an impenetrable formation. They completely abandoned their horses, avoiding the danger which had befallen them in the battle of Falkirk, where the Scottish cavalry, seeing the large numbers of English advancing in such good order, took to flight and left footsoldiers to die in the field. [Johannis de Trokelowe...Ed. Riley, H.T. pub Longmans et al, 1866; BR 191-192] Thus, for Trokelowe, Bruce led his whole army into a position close to the English camp in the Carse where their cavalry had the leading position for the foxhunt of rebels, and waited for them to charge, which they eventually did.

Lanercost 1314: p207 '**When the two armies had approached** very near each other. (only the Scots moved: the English were not going anywhere, still drunk. The monk hears the story and writes down his expectation) **All the Scots fell on their knees to repeat Pater noster, commending themselves to God and seeking help from heaven; after which they advanced boldly against the English. [The Scots advance further, closer to the English, who are in their camp in the Carse]** (Imagine it: the Scots are close and they stop to pray? Impossible. They were setting their pikes. The only thing on their mind. They knelt down because that was the way to defend a cavalry charge: the monk writing this thinks kneeling means praying. He may even have been talking to a monk who was present.) They had so arranged their army that two columns went abreast in advance of the third, so that neither should be in advance of the other; and the third followed, in which was Robert (the third was commanded by Edward Bruce: similar colours. Robert Bruce had to be in front of the whole army, as Trokelowe and Baker and Vita all say he was: to decide where to set the pikes.) Of a truth, when both armies engaged each other, and the great horses of the English charged the pikes of the Scots, as it were into a dense forest, there arose a great and terrible crash of spears broken and of destriers wounded to the death; and so they remained without movement for a while. Now the English in the rear could not reach the Scots because the leading division was in the way, nor could they do anything to help themselves, (jammed between the bounding streams) wherefore there was nothing for it but to take to flight....Another calamity

which befel (sic) the English was that, **whereas they had shortly before crossed a great ditch called Bannock burn, into which the tide flows, and now wanted to recross it** in confusion (they have charged the Scots, who had set their pikes, halted them and so many were killed that defeat was inevitable), many nobles and others fell into it with their horses in the crush, while others escaped with much difficulty, and many were never able to extricate themselves from the ditch; thus Bannock burn was spoken about for many years in English throats. [Maxwell's trans. Glasgow, 1913] Note: What we are talking about all the time is the burn not the place Bannockburn, for that did not exist in 1314 even by 1750, as Roy's brilliantly accurate map tells us. Even so, some Englishmen might have run the two words together because the battle happened mainly in a place: the Carse of Balquhiderock which had no name then. The concept of a carse was centuries in the future. Trokelowe did not know the word. 'Bannockmora' he called it: a plain beside the Bannock. He wrote in Latin. **Lanercost says the Scots have moved into the Carse and the battle was fought in the Carse where the English had camped.**

Geoffrey Le Baker [1329-]: 'To that place [Stirling] the proud host of the English who were accustomed to fight on horseback brought up great quantities of coursers, warhorses and polished armour and also a numerous soldiery who exhibited brash over-confidence. In a spirit of self-flattery they promised themselves the victory...and were so confident in their own security that besides...horses, arms and supplies in abundance, they got together to bring with them vessels of gold and silver such as men of rank are used to indulge themselves with in times of peace. Never up to that time nor later has been seen so much nobility so nobly equipped nor swelled with such arrogance, entrusting itself solely to the warlike favour of Mars as the noted Carmelite, Brother R. Baston... laments in his verses which he was present as a captive of the Scots...On that night you might have seen the English race, not in the manner of living angels but sodden with wine, vomiting up their drink and crying 'Wassail and Drinkhail'...[p7] In contrast, the Scots celebrated the holy festival in silence and fasting...The next day... The King their leader [Bruce], having forbidden any to mount a warhorse, the Scottish army was divided as customary into groups **not far from the aforementioned ditch** (the Bannock burn)..... BR p198. [Le Baker is telling us the battle took place in ground beside the Bannock burn, the only ditch possible, mentioned by others. The Carse is the only place near the burn where a battle could be fought and they are camped in the Carse where they have been drinking all night]. 'Of those killed in the above fight a considerable number (of their own men) were accounted for by a troop of archers of no assigned position; formerly, they would be set behind the armed men whereas the custom now is to station them on the flanks... **When they saw the Scots press forwards fiercely** [The Scots are advancing towards the English who are in their camp, many drunk and unready]....some of them shot their arrows up into the air only for them to come down uselessly among the enemy's helmets.' The English archers have been given no assigned position and are behind the cavalry wherever they could find a space. So they cannot see, over the heads of their cavalry on six foot high horses, the Scots, who are kneeling with their pikes set and the English archers are even hemmed in by people cramming forward to see what is happening, making the loading of arrows and aiming, even more difficult. **Some English knights are shot**

in the back. There would be screams and the archers would stop shooting, ordered to or not. The overconfidence of the English knights means they do not believe infantry or archers will be needed. Their 3,000 heavy cavalry on huge armoured horses will be enough to deal with Scottish peasants. The drinking and singing reinforces this. That is why the archers and infantry are not under control but back in the rear 'in no assigned position'. [Chronica Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. E. Maunde Thompson, Oxford, 1889 p6-10; BR p195-199]

The Scots advance on the English who are still drunk in their camp, archers behind their cavalry as well as infantry. That English archers shoot their own men in the back and stop shooting and others shot high but arrows fall uselessly on helmets, means the cavalry in front are in the way, the archers cannot see the Scots kneeling (as we know they do twice) for their own cavalry on six foot high horses are in between.

Baston 1314:(present at the battle) 'While they [The English] **spend the night in braggartry and revelry with Bacchus**, they do wrong to you, Scotland, by reviling you with empty words.' [Scotichronicon Vol VI Bk XII p309 76-78] The English are drunk and boastful.

Baston 1314: 'The English fighters look expectantly for Scots whom they may do to death – **Scots no longer remote but close at hand**. [Scotichronicon Vol VI Bk XII lines 160,161] The Scots have advanced a distance towards the English in their camp. Across the Carse.

Baston 1314: '**Rushing down**, the raging Scottish fighters **advance on foot**, extracting ruinous payment for what they expend [ibid Bk XII 169,170]

Thus the Scots have left the Dryfield, 70 ft above the Carse, descended the wood and crossed the Carse to get close to the English cavalry lines which are out of bowshot of Balquhiderock Wood. The English, expecting a foxhunt of Scottish rebels in the morning, get drunk and sing all night long.

The Unknown in Scotichronicon [1314]: Vol 6 21 p357 line 3: 'The king of Scots with part of his foot soldiers (some were unfit, as Barbour says) **laid low the English and routed their cavalry along with their king. There is a stream called the Bannock which is witness to this**, in which lay the drowned bodies of those who had taken to flight.' Because they are fleeing across the Bannock burn, we know they have been fighting in the Carse where the English camped.

p359, line 40: 'The Forth buries many men well-equipped with arms and horses.'

p359, line 61: '**The muddy Bannock holds those whose names we do not know.**'

p359, line 73-75: '**Between the stony stream and the obstruction of their camp the treacherous English people come to grief** as a result of their own dishonest conduct.' p361.

The battle is in the Carse because the English are mostly killed between their Camp and the Bannock burn.

Brut y Tywysogyon [1314]: ‘On the eve of St John (23rd June 1314) and on that day (24th) occurred the encounter in the Pools, (in the Carse) when the earl of Gloucester was killed with many Englishmen besides slain by the Scots and the King of England fled the field.’ [Peniarth [Ms20 p123, GB 159]. Thus, this refers to the battle of Bannockburn which was fought in the Carse on the 24th June 1314 and the English were defeated, the earl of Gloucester slain and many Englishmen besides and King Edward II fled the field. **The Battle is in the Carse among the pools.**

Barbour [1377]: ‘And when the King of England saw the Scots take the hard field so openly and on foot he was surprised and said, ‘What will yon Scots fight?’ ‘Yes, indeed, sir,’ said a knight, Sir Ingram Umphraville, ‘Forsooth now, sir, I see it is the most surprising sight I ever saw, for the Scots have taken the on the might of England, to give battle on the plain hard field.’ [Bk XII p471, 447-459; BR p243]. **The Scots have astonished the King and Umphraville who can see them approach because they are up on the Knoll 60 ft above the Carse floor.** The Scots are in the Carse, advancing on the English.

Why is this a proof? Because the three propositions stated have been seen to be correct. Six chronicle sources confirm the first. Five confirm the second. Nine chronicle sources confirm the third. In twenty years, these have never been queried. No other sources are relevant. The Scots retained the Dryfield on day 1 and the English camped in the Carse. The Scots left the Dryfield at dawn on day 2 and advanced upon the English in their camp. No other sources are relevant.

Conclusion: the Battle of Bannock burn was fought in the Carse of Balquhiderock.

The English camped in the Carse the night before the main battle. Archdeacon Barbour tells us this and Brut y Tywysogyon tells us the battle was fought among the pools. That is among the pools in the Carse, for Barbour says there were pools in the Carse at that time. GB p146 explains why this Carse is unique in regularly possessing many pools of water after heavy rain: it is an enclosed Carse, like no other around. Thus its water table is high and water forms in the undulations of the flat ground. Surrounding carses are different: they are not enclosed, so they terminate at the surface of the R Forth, usually 40 ft down. Thus, water is easily absorbed by the ground under them. The photos of the pools in the Carse on different dates confirm this. Scalacronica confirms that the battle was fought in the Carse because the English debouched onto a plain near the water of Forth beyond the Bannock burn where they ‘unharnessed and remained all night’. That is, they camped. An ‘evil deep wet marsh’? Not so. It had many pools of water. That did not make it a marsh. Barbour, the Brut y Tywysogyon, all the photos of the pools on different occasions and the zizag road on all the maps aerial photos of the zig zag road tell us it is pools. Gray Senior, was imprisoned by the Scots and would not see it clearly. Anyway, when the Scots approached, the English (some of them on the Knoll who could see them) were ‘mounting in great alarm’. That is, they were taken by surprise in their camp. And their camp was in the Carse. Thus there are three

sources which tell us the English camped in the Carse the night before the battle. Add to them Trokelowe who said 'This most deadly battle was fought near Stirling Castle at a moor near the Bannock burn' which the sources agree had been crossed into to make camp. Lanercost: 'Another calamity which befell the English was that, whereas they had shortly before crossed a great ditch called the Bannock burn into which the tide flows and now wanted to recross it (after camping and being attacked in the morning). This means they camped that night in the Carse and were forced to flee after the battle in the early morning. Le Baker also refers to the great ditch of the Bannock burn as does the Unknown in Scotichronicon who says most Englishmen were killed between the camp and the Bannock burn. Baston tells of the Scots leaving the Dryfield and crossing the Carse on foot to fight the English who are camped there.

Thus Vita, Scalacronica, Lanercost, Trokelowe, Le Baker, Barbour, Brut y Tywysogyon, Baston and The Unknown in Scotichronicon (BK XII Vol 6, 21 p357), 9 sources, agree that the Scots moved from the Dryfield, everyone on foot, across the Carse early in the morning of the 24th June 1314 and set their pikes very close to the English in their camp among the pools and waited for them to charge when they were ready. That makes the battle in the Carse.

Since, according to the proper application of scientific method, these three propositions should be accepted, the conclusion that the main battle of Bannock burn was fought in the Carse of Balquhiderock should now become part of our knowledge; and that knowledge is objective knowledge. See *Objective Knowledge* by Sir Karl Popper, p121. The foregoing is definitely objective knowledge. So are the many proofs in BR, BP,GB, BGB, BS, GS and Bannockburn the Poem.

6. Corollaries

1. **There would be rules for the use of a pike.** It had three safe positions: flat on the ground, vertical, when carried, and sloping forward over the shoulders of those in front when set to receive a cavalry charge. The front row gave a dunt to the butt of the pike beside the right heel, knelt down first and held it sloping forward. One hand was enough. The axe hung from a string on the wrist, a targe (small shield) was on the left forearm to deflect a lance. The pike ideally was 15ft by an inch and three quarters. An inch and half would do. The dunt set the pike in the ground about an inch. The butt would be left in that position, only the head of the pike moved. A gap between the men across the Carse would be about two feet wide, allowing the pike to be aimed to lodge in the oncoming equine tank or its rider. Otherwise, the men would be bunched. Then fourteen pikes, seven on each side, would strike each horse or rider before the lance (which is shorter) hit any in the front rank. GB p305-309. **The momentum is taken by the ground not the man**, an essential! The effect is like hitting a tree trunk about two feet wide. 14 x 1.75 inches. The pikes were expected to break and they did break, as Lanercost tells: 'the great horses of the English charged the pikes of the Scots, as it were into a dense forest, there arose a great and terrible crash of

spears broken and of destriers wounded to the death.' p208. Some of these are pikes not just lances.

Note: great care would be taken in raising a pike into the vertical before setting off by everyone. In close packed columns of men on foot, keeping one's feet was essential. To trip or fall was to injure a comrade. Anyone who did fall, by stepping in a hole or shot by an arrow, would be stepped over and left. The integrity of the formation was fundamental to its success.

No hint of this arrangement has been preserved in the sources. The detail is too complex to be recorded or even noticed by observers at a battle amid all the commotion. It would have been worked out carefully by Bruce beforehand and practised in secret. But there are signs of it in the battle a century later at Otterburn where pikes were still basic equipment for the Scots. By then, some things had been forgotten. There, pikemen were deployed on a slope, not flat ground. Because it rained heavily during the battle, the slope became very slippery and some of the ranks fell like ninepins, injuring each other. One reason for the loss of the Scots at this battle. Note: is it possible Bruce did something else? Yes, but it is likely to be very close to this. At least this works. Most of the elements are inevitable: the butt fixed in the ground-essential; the gap between men in the same line parallel to the battle line-essential to aim the pike; bunching men on the other axis is likely because it increases the number of pikes that hit each equine tank. This halts the cavalry quicker and saves Scottish lives. Bruce would know all this, see it himself.

2. **Bruce set his pikes twice.** Four sources tell us. GB p297-300. Every source is written by a clergyman! **Kneeling is taken to be praying.** Not so! Since the armies are near each other, it is too late for that. They are kneeling to set the pikes.

Lanercost: 1314 When the armies were near each other, 'all the Scots fell on their knees to repeat the Pater noster, (The *Our Father* prayer) commending themselves to God and seeking help from heaven; after which they advanced boldly against the English [Maxwell, 207]

Note: They advanced boldly because the English were unprepared, still drunk and singing. Bruce could see that they could do nothing to stop him stealing some more space their cavalry could use to get up speed. So he stood up and told them to rise. They did so and they marched forward again, depriving the cavalry of more space until there was hardly any left. Then the pikes were reset and the Scots waited for the English to mount and charge. Bruce would not have said much, would not have shouted. The men would follow his standard. The Scots were silent as far as possible throughout. Did nothing to provoke the English who were shocked by it and took longer than ever to get ready. How close were the Scots? Yards away! That is the logic. The less space for the cavalry, the better. It saved Scottish lives. Only two Scottish knights were killed (Ross and Vieuxpont (old bridge)). The English could do nothing to prevent it. The few archers on picket duty were out of it behind the cavalry by this time: fled from the huge advancing hedgehog of pikes; melted into their own lines. A few arrows would be fired by them during the approach but no notice was taken by the main body who saw nothing for the black

backdrop of Balquhiderock Wood at the cusp of dawn. The Scots would reach their first position in under 4 minutes of marching, seen by hardly anyone until very close. As Trokelowe (the best on this) tells us, the Scots waited for the English to charge once they reached their second position. They would wait at least five minutes while the English mounted and charged individually when ready. Most of the drunken Englishmen would not register the presence of the Scots when they reached their first position with the dark background behind them.

Barbour 1377: 'The Scotsmen all together **knelt down to pray** to God... and when the English king had sight of them kneeling, he said at once, 'Yon folk are kneeling to ask mercy.' Sir Ingram said, 'You are right this time; they ask mercy but not from you. They ask God (for mercy) for their sins. I'll tell you something for a fact, that yon men will win all or die; none will flee for fear of death.' Then the king said, 'So be it.' And then without further ado they had the bugle call for the attack.' [BkXII Duncan's 472]

If this is correct, there is no call to the cavalry to attack until after the Scots have set their pikes the first time. Since command and control has never been arranged, deemed unnecessary, [a foxhunt of Scottish peasants is expected] if a bugle is blown no one is ready to respond. Moreover, Gloucester has still to make his gallant charge to halt the Scots when they seek to close off all the space for the cavalry to charge. The one certainty is that before the Scots receive the charge, they have reset their pikes much closer. Why would none of the monks around the Knoll see this? Because the second setting of the pikes was so close to the lines of cavalry that they could not be seen even from there. The ground in front of the Knoll would be strewn with wagons, horses, tents, tables, chairs, servants, equipment of every description, in no order, as reported. They were on holiday.

Bernard de Linton (Abbot of Arbroath) [1314]: 'Barefooted..and wearing his canonicals, Maurice Abbot of Inchaffray went before them bearing a crucifix like a commander, and before the battle was engaged **he told them all to kneel** and pray to God... [It is unbelievable that a senior monk would be in front doing anything, still less, dressed up for the occasion] Seeing this, the English, buoyed up with a baseless light-heartedness, began to shout: 'Look! All those Scots have surrendered to us with trembling hearts.'...Ingram de Umphraville formed a sounder understanding and replied to them saying: 'You are right that they are surrendering, but to God, not to you.'...At this, the Scots rose eagerly and attacked their enemies. (ie marched forward to reach the position to reset their pikes). [Scotichonicon Vol VI Bk XII p365]

The Canon of Bridlington [1330s]: 'And as a true Catholic..he [Robert the Bruce] made all his men take thought before going into battle through the agency of the ecclesiastics so that each one received the Eucharist well-confessed and contrite...that they should all having first heard mass **and knelt in most devoted fashion** in the Lord's presence, humbly beseeching grace and praying God for the liberation of the kingdom [Scotland]. When the English saw this they smiled and said: 'Look the Scots have yielded to us asking our pardon'; but a certain knight old in years but sounder in his wits

than they, said to them in answer: 'It is true that they yield themselves; but it is not to you but to Almighty God; in whom they place their hope and have their trust. [Gesta Edwardi Caernarvon, p48.]

Thus, the Scots knelt down and are presumed to be praying and even to have been confessed and received the Eucharist (as if that were possible on a battlefield!) in front of the very superior English army close to them, under their very eye! **Where was the bread and wine to come from? Who distributed it?** This is incorrect. It is what the author would like to have happened but it is impossible. None of this occurred just before a battle to save the country and its people from rape, pillage and domination. Again! **Giving bread and wine to the Scottish army before the battle, still less, during the change of position, crossing the Carse, is inconceivable.**

We can see what happened. The Scots knelt to set their pikes. Praying had nothing to do with it! Having set them the first time, in the first position, penning the English between the bounding streams, seeing the English unready, drunk and singing, some of them, and that nothing could be done to stop him, Bruce got his pikemen on their feet and moved the whole army closer. Why? **Because every yard he stole from their cavalry reduced their speed and saved Scottish lives.**

What would Englishmen on foot at the front edge of their camp do if the Scots marched very close to them? How close? Five yards? Faced by thousands of Scots bristling like a thick set hedge, pikes at the ready? What would they do? To do anything was to die: a pike in the guts, thrown; or an arrow shot by an archer just behind. Getting out of there as fast as possible would be wise. If he were a cavalryman, he would want to mount. He might have to be winched into position because of his armour. That is why it is as close as five yards. Probably, the surprise was so dramatic that none of the English moved at all. They were too astonished.

It is clear that no clergymen dressed in their robes, dispensing wine and wafers were involved at all. The Scots knelt down to set their pikes, the essential kit for defending the eventual cavalry charge (once the English got over their surprise and got mounted). These four clergymen are mistaken about the Scots kneeling to pray.

3. **The map.** This has been justified in a volume of book length that can be studied. It has been confirmed by several people. It is written up in BR (100 pages), BP (71 coloured A4 pages, 27,000 words A4 p176-200), GB (First colour section, Chs IV, VI et al, Appendices). Every detail. Making the map was exhaustively performed and involved a decent fraction of a thousand days at the battle area and related areas over many years, a process that was full time for a dozen years. Essential, because of the rate of change of the battle area due to building. The council were obstructive and refused to listen. Their employees believed themselves experts: they knew nothing, were like children. When a council or the National Trust or Historic Scotland pays people to be experts, it assumes they are. Not so. They are all very ignorant! Read this website; read this proof; read the maps; read this article. They are

governed by prejudice, what they are told to do and fear of losing their status and even their jobs. They tell lies.

4. **The translations of pulis and polles:** these are now correct. Both mean pools. GB Ch VI demolishes Barrow's theory and Duncan's translation, as impossible, utterly unwarranted and idiotic, the idea that pulis = streams. How any Scotsman could entertain such nonsense given the singular pul which in the 14th century had the plural pulis, and Barbour's Bruce is full of them, is a mystery: eccentricity is the answer, for he translated **every one of them except the one that matters**, correctly, in 1998! No map has ever shown streams there. The defining condition of this Carse, and it is a unique one because it is enclosed, GB 146, is pools of water. Many photos of them have been taken after heavy rain. The road across the Carse has had to zigzag across it because of them, shown on every map back to and including Roy's, c 1750. Thirty four pools have been counted on one occasion, one of them 100 yards long and a yard deep, two others about 80 yards, the rest substantial, some an acre wide. The list of examples Barrow gave on p212 Robert Bruce, 'Polmaise, Cockspow, Drypow, Powdrake, Powside, Powbridge, Pow burn and the Pelstream burn while just across the Forth is the old estate of Powis', is all mistaken. The only one that is a stream is the Pelstream and the example fails—should not be in the list—because it is not in the Carse but a bounding stream that defines it. The others, when visited (what Barrow never did) almost all have no stream anywhere near, even within a mile. Pow means pool. Powis is the one exception: the stream can dry up and when it does, because two sources come out of a high hill to the NE, the water table falls below them in summer. Of course it becomes a line of pools. It even had a pool near the back of the house, S side, dug out to contain fish even when there were only pools elsewhere. Just like Polmoodie burn to the west, near Moffat, Polmood on the other side of the mountains to the north, both photographed and explained in detail in GB 175,179. Every pol place-name on the two maps of Barrow's shown in GB 169,170 is a decent fraction of a mile from the nearest stream, meaning that the place had nothing to do with it. There had to be a pool beside it for the house to be built beside water. Every dwelling, just like a campsite, is sited because water is close, immediate. Otherwise it must be carried: a waste of time. The Pulwhinnrick burn, Kilstay, Galloway, has a single huge pool because of the absence of water pressure in a narrow peninsula with low hills. GB 179. Palgowan near Newton Stewart also is built beside a large pool. GB 173. **How is it possible that for seven centuries historians travelled back and forth to Stirling with the Carse in plain sight and the pools of water, 34 of them! were never noticed? And every map shows the road across it zigzagging around them? Every time it rained heavily they had to be seen!** Historians? Thy name is stupidity. They saw them and registered nothing. Scotland is full of such names: not just pul and polle in the 14th century, but pol, pow and pal right now and they all mean the same thing: pool. They never mean stream. The most frequent is powmill because, by that name, the miller advertised the fact that his stream would not dry up in a dry summer, for

he had dug a reservoir which alone would drive the mill. Mostly just one, but in the western borders was a mill a century ago with **four separate reservoirs**, each the size of a loch, able separately to be connected to the mill by a sluice. That mill was never going to fail to grind corn. Pow means pool. Pul means pool. Polle means pool. Pol means pool. Pal means pool.

Note: hundreds of streams (in the borders) have the syllable pol or pul. If pol meant stream, every instance would commit the offence of pleonasm:

Polharrow burn would mean 'stream harrow stream': a tautology: nonsense.

The syllable pol has to mean something useful. Pol means pool because the Polharrow burn comes out of a loch, Loch Harrow. In summer, the level of the loch falls. When it falls below the exit level of the stream, it ceases to flow: it then becomes a line of pools with no movement of water. That is what the syllable pol is designed to tell us.

There is more to be said; a paper with an exhaustive investigation. Watch this space.

5. **How Bruce got his men to believe the English were afraid:** Scalacronica, alone of all the English sources (and Scottish) says the English were afraid. BR p254 has the figures of statements counted [6 afraid to 57 overconfident]. This is because the father of the author of Scalacronica, Sir Thomas Gray, was imprisoned in the Scottish camp the night before the battle. He heard the message from Sir Alexander Seaton who was alleged to have come from the English side the night before the battle to try to convince the Scots to attack the next morning because the English were afraid. That is where the six come from. Why were the Scots not already fleeing into the wilderness to escape their enemies, if they did not mean to attack, making use of the daylight? How did Seaton escape notice from the English in the Carse, any one of whom would have seen him, as it was broad daylight until very late. One arrow in the back, would have been enough. Crossing the empty Carse from one side to the other, alone, would have been very dangerous. Yet all the English were overconfident, as they had every reason to be. Once their full army with all that mass of heavy cavalry had arrived, they had nothing to fear. That they all got drunk that night, confirms it.

When ransomed after the battle, Sir Thomas Gray told his son, Thomas, author of Scalacronica, that the English were afraid. They were not. So it is a lie. That is where he got the information and it is the only source that shares it. The discontinuity means that Bruce got hold of Seaton, who probably never reached the English camp, thought better of fighting against his own people, and persuaded him to come into his tent and tell the tale that the English were afraid. Why? Then the news would go round the Scottish camp like wildfire and they would believe they could win. A necessity, if they were going to win. The team that will win, must believe they will win. None of the sources within the English camp believed the English were afraid. Why would they be? They got drunk, boastful and sang. Why is this definitely correct? Because the English were hugely overconfident! The chronicle sources all say this. They had to be overconfident given their three or four thousand heavy cavalry opposed by 500 light Scottish cavalry: no contest! Of course they were

confident, in holiday mood, they drank all night, sang and boasted. Baker 7 BR 196, Baston BR 206; Vita and Trokelowe BR 175, 179 have told us. But the folk in the Scottish camp thought the opposite. Why? Because Seaton came to tell them so. That makes it a lie and one Bruce engineered.

- 6. Marshalling: How did Bruce get his men ready on the Carse at dawn to cross it on foot and march close to the enemy in their camp?** This move had to be made on the cusp of dawn and in silence. With the black background of Balquiderock Wood behind them, the Scots might not be noticed until they got very close. The Scots were in three divisions: all the English sources who saw them Vita, Scalacronica, Trokelowe, Lanercost (BR p254) all say so. Only Barbour says four: he was wrong, wrote too late to know. There would be a gap between the three divisions, as they say. The wings slightly ahead of the centre with the two Bruce divisions. Bruce led the whole army and had to be out in front of it to make the decision where to set the pikes which would follow his standard, each division following its commander with his standard. Speed in forming the formation was essential. The centre division slept in their formation in the Wood close to the edge of it but out of sight. As the light came up, they would move out onto the Carse in dead silence and in their ranks. Great care would be taken making the pikes vertical, having been horizontal during their sleep. The best fighters, all the knights, would be in the front rank but only wearing light armour for mobility: helmet and breastplate: axe on a string on the wrist, small targe on the forearm. Moray's division would sleep beside in Pelstream Woods in a line parallel to the Pelstream. At the cusp of dawn, the head would move out into the Carse and would circle around to be just ahead of the centre division. Thus the front row would have been in the line nearest the Pelstream. On the right wing, Douglas's troops would sleep in the Bannock Valley hidden by trees and parallel to the Bannockburn. The best fighters would be nearest the burn. When they moved to join up with the centre, these men would be in the front. When Bruce began to move out onto the Carse, everyone would be aware of it and begin to move. In this way, within a few minutes, the Scots would be arranged in the Carse with their pikes vertical in three divisions with a gap between each. The wings at the front measured about 200 yards. The centre measured about 400 yards. The gaps about five to ten yards. As they follow Bruce into the Carse towards the enemy camp, the Carse tapers to about 830 yards, less because of the recent rain and the pools. Say 820 yards. The first position of the pikes that was wanted was the line from the Great bend (shown on the map). This meant that the line to be defended was about 100 yard less. The pikes would be set there. For the battle would be won there if the English charged. If the English were unready, Bruce would get his pikemen up and march them forward as close as possible. The four clerical sources tell us he did so. That is why so few Scotsmen were killed: the English cavalry had little room in which to charge. Note: Any space in the gaps (very little is possible) would be filled by men from the rear. Every man on the front rank (and every other rank) is separated from the man to the side by about two feet, in which to aim the pike at the equine tank. Otherwise, men

are tight packed to increase the number of pike points that come to bear on the equine tank. 14 on one knight is likely.

7. Why is this a proof of the site of battle? Because the three propositions have been shown to be correct from the available sources which have been quoted and explained. No sources contradict them. These are the most detailed—the only ones with any detail— (the first thing to vanish in a source late in the 14th century or later). Invariably, a late source is a small paragraph with nothing relevant, a few words often. The map and the sources and the corollaries combine to explain the entire matter. The Scots defended the Dryfield successfully on day 1, the English were driven off and camped in the Carse where they usually camped because of the bounding streams and pools where water for an army at midsummer was essential, and the Scots left the Dryfield and advanced against the English in their camp at sunrise, taking them by surprise. All the details which account for these moves have been given. The sources reveal many of them when read intelligently. So the battle makes excellent sense. The sources, the method used to manage pikes and the marshalling, the ground and the justified maps all combine to provide an explanation which is secure. How Bruce got his men to believe they could win: get Seaton to pretend to cross over from their camp and tell the lie that the English were afraid. This is definitely correct, like the rest of it: Scalacronica is the only source which says the English are afraid; and that is because the author's father is the only source in the Scottish camp the night before the battle, taken prisoner the same day.

Several indisputable insights have indisputable consequences. The Scots all fought on foot, every one of them, including Bruce, the king. Proved in BR p254. Since the English were camped in the Carse drinking, singing and boasting, there has to be a reason that the Scots are all on foot. They intend to imprison the English cavalry, drawn up in the best positions for the foxhunt of peasants in the morning, just out of bowshot of Balquhiderock Wood, by setting their pikes right across the Carse from one side to the other, about 800 yards, because of the recent rain that had fallen forming the pools. AND they intend to get as close as possible to the English. Because then, the cavalry did not have room to get up speed. That is a necessary consequence. To set the pikes as close as possible. They might have to set them fifty yards away, more. Even then, they should manage to halt the cavalry charge when it came, when they were ready. There are enough Scots to manage this: not six thousand but eighteen or twenty even. But if, as Bruce expected, knowing them, their superiority, overconfidence in their own cavalry, which he knew that they thought sufficient by themselves, then they would be unprepared when he first closed off the Carse. Thus, there would be time to get them up and move them really close. And we know this happened because the four clergymen all said that after kneeling to pray, the Scots got up again and advanced boldly upon the English cavalry lines. That means, the Scots got as close as they wanted because, as Bruce could see, they were taken completely by surprise and they could do nothing to prevent him setting his

pikes as close as he wished. And that is what he did. The Scottish lines were getting really close, when Gloucester alone (seeing the Scots advance on foot, knew in a flash what Bruce intended) made a dash at Douglas leading his own division along the burnside, got past him but was brought down and slain by the men following Douglas. The Scots set their pikes right across the Carse in front of the cavalry lines, within yards of them. Because there was nothing they could do to prevent it. These are the crucial moves that determine the result of the battle. We see why Bruce had to be in front of the whole army: to make the decision where to set the pikes finally. He wanted to take them as close as possible but could he? That was the question only he could answer. To save him from arrows on the march, shields would be held up by squires on either side, enabling him to see between them. Where his standard went, everyone behind him went; and everyone on both flanks which would naturally converge and close. [The Carse tapers from over 900 yards to less than 830 in rainy weather.]

Essential facts:

1. The Scots were all on foot. BR p254 et prior; p211 et prior.
2. They moved to imprison the English in their camp between the bounding streams (cavalry in front, for the foxhunt of rebels, next morning). See maps on the website. [The failure to show the line of the Pelstream correctly is a disaster committed by many, such as Barrow and Watson. Impossible to understand Bruce's genius move. It must follow the slope to Kersmills; but near the Knoll it must bear left]
3. Having closed off the Carse, the Scots set their pikes.
4. Seeing that the English were unready, asleep, overconfident, singing and drunk, Bruce got his men up and moved them forward very close to the cavalry and reset his pikes. Why? To cut down the space for the English cavalry charge, saving Scottish lives. He could see that there was nothing the English could do to prevent it. What could they do to halt him moving his pikes forward and resetting them just yards away? Nothing. They were not even armed. [All the 4 relevant sources report the Scots get up after 'praying' and move forward: that means resetting the pikes closer: yards away!]
5. The English cavalry charge, when it came, in dribs and drabs, no leader, hardly out of a trot, was easily halted. Successive lines hit the back of the first and did no damage to the Scots. Cavalry no longer, they were pulled down and slain with hatchets.
6. Scottish archers, standing behind their kneeling pikemen, shot knights easily on their six foot high horses. English archers could not see the kneeling Scottish pikemen over the heads of their own cavalry nine foot high, shot some of their own men in the back and stopped shooting. Others aimed high and arrows bounced uselessly off helmets. Loading and aiming arrows was obstructed by the movement of people behind rushing forward to see what was happening, filling the space vacated by the cavalry. Killing the English knights was easy. The King would have been captured for ransom. When he was led away off the field, the English turned to flee. The hatchet spike was the main weapon of the Scots when chasing the English from the field.

This is what happened on the Carse on 24th June 1314. All these actions were necessary for the Scots to win. That they did win, shows they were necessary. **They were all available in the year 2000 in Bannockburn Revealed (BR). They were read by the historians in control and nothing whatever was said about them. Reviews were refused, papers were refused, for all the following years on several occasions and the books were buried, so that the singular progress achieved for the first time, would never come to the attention of the History Community or the People of Scotland, for whom the research was done. The historians in control buried the work that solved the problems because they could not do it themselves and wished it had never been done. And none of them, as arranged, mentioned this work even in bibliographies. Books on the battle listed in Wikipedia were limited to the rubbish of the 14th century, all of it disproved, which those in control clung to. Advances in the subject were kept out. All to save face. And mine had done so much twenty years ago.** The Wikipedia only accepts books approved by authorities like Barrow. One person, not a historian, c2001 + at least, is in control and as an aggressive authoritarian himself, he follows the advice of those in control: Barrow or his appointees. This person did not read BR (or any of the others). BR is different: consists of questions, issues, arguments and insights to answer them and they are all rated and many are proofs. Too much for this man. He is used to a simple tale of derring do, all most books ever are. So the Wikipedia merely distances the correct version (this research) further from readers who mainly depend on Wikipedia and do not use books. Barrow et al would know that. Everything about the battle has to be proved. It is not elementary to do this or even to read. It takes years of effort to research and write. So quite a few enthusiasts are not equipped to understand it. But many do. This research has enjoyed a lot of high praise from readers as the books show. Many have no university training. None of the books are listed in the bibliography in Wikipedia. All the second rate books that regurgitate the same drivel from the 14th century are there in regiments. Ronald McNair Scott (who invited me to lunch) would have been horrified to discover that my books were not listed there. We were not related.

8. Mathematical Proof

One of the greatest mathematicians in the world in the first half of the twentieth century was Prof G.H. Hardy F.R.S., of both Oxford and Cambridge. In a paper: 'Mathematical Proof' in *Mind*, 1929, he wrote: 'There are two different motives in any presentation of a proof. The first is simply to secure conviction. The second is to exhibit the conclusion as the climax of a conventional pattern of propositions, a sequence of propositions whose truth is admitted and which are arranged in accordance with rules.'

Both of these can be seen here. Three propositions are shown to be correct: one, two and three above. Nine chronicle sources (of course the ground itself and all the maps, and the map of the battle area in 1314 are all sources, hundreds of maps old and new, continually consulted, and hundreds of

documents and the long term residents of relevant areas of interest who were consulted) all explain the battle (in the books of this research) and that it took place in the Carse and, with the corollaries, how the battle was won by the Scots: their technique in marshalling (in BGB p92), marching on foot into their new position, closing off the Carse, imprisoning the English cavalry between their infantry and archers and the Scots advancing; and the final move made by the Scots to get as close as possible, when Bruce realised the English were unprepared, having been drinking and singing all night. He got his pikes up, advanced and reset them closer still. Everything fits and makes sense in the sources and on the map. The books of this research are important sources as are all the corollaries attached to the proofs.

The chronicle sources used have been available for seven centuries. Another, if discovered, is likely to confirm them. If it did not it would not shake our complex, well justified and confirmed view of the battle and its conduct. It is beyond reasonable possibility that ten sources could be discovered which altered that picture and the site of battle. Thus, what we have is a proof of the site of battle. We have a very secure description of it, how it develops in that terrain and what the reasons are for the outcome. The Scots won because of superior generalship, superior strategy (defending the ford) and tactics (such setting his pikes twice) in the Carse where the enemy had camped, as usual and as expected and leadership: Bruce got his men to believe the English were afraid (the story of Seaton in Scalacronica tells us) and he roused them to fight at the limit of their skill and strength by training beforehand (managing pikes). His personal contribution is phenomenal. No other word is appropriate. The idea, the move that won the battle (penning the English between the bounding streams of the Carse, very close to them, depriving their cavalry of space to get up speed, so that they were cavalry only briefly) is brilliant. Where, in the military history of the world, is there another dazzling move like that? But it also took preparation: his men had to be trained to use their pikes safely. He had to possess huge self-belief to lead the army himself, out in front, on foot! That is precisely what Vita, Trokelowe and Le Baker have told us! GB 31,32 (where 4 others say the Scots were all on foot). See the quotes in the proof. To make the decision where to set the pikes. He had to have the gift of man management, composure and nerve as well as courage. The measure of that move of genius is that no historian in seven centuries has ever understood it, any of it, **and all would have lost the battle had they been in charge**. Including Lt General Christison, hero of Arakan, Burma in WWII, for he did not understand where to defend the road: at the Ford (in his 1957 paper in the Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries). That is how good Bruce was! Better than one of our best generals in WWII.

The proof of the battle (not just the site of battle, for that is what this is: all the essential details described and explained) relies upon a number of decisive insights (DI). The first two are above: enclosing the enemy between the bounding streams of the Carse. And taking the pikes as close as possible, for in reducing the space for the cavalry to charge, they were easily halted, and cavalry no longer: it saved Scottish lives. Bruce used a hand axe on de

Bohun. It would have been attached by a string to his wrist, easy to use, then, could not have been handier. Available in an instant. Trokelowe tells us about the axes possessed by every Scot in the battle. Annales 84, BR 192. Vita 52, BR 175, confirms it. These too would have been on the wrist. For the essential weapons to halt the cavalry charge (the main problem for the Scots to deal with) were pikes. The method is described herein before. The shields Trokelowe mentions can only be targes, short shields on the forearm to deflect the lance. The method of setting the pikes which had to be front to back and orderly, the gap between men to aim the pike, the bunching of men behind each other to maximise the number of pikes that would strike the equine tank before the lance hits the front rank, that all follows from the initial ideas D1,D2. Bruce had to lead the whole army to make that decision, which means Edward Bruce led the two Bruce schiltroms. His colours being like his brother's would confuse observers who spoke to Barbour who positioned Bruce at the rear. Not a chance. Trokelowe even tells us Bruce led on foot to make his men believe they would not be deserted as they were at Falkirk when the Scottish knights fled and left the footsoldiers to die. Not the main reason but a reason.

The decision to defend the one road from Falkirk to Stirling at Milton Ford (D3) is a masterstroke which no historian in seven centuries ever saw. Yet the Ford is Scotland's Thermopylae: the one place where the enemy are confined to crossing the burn a few at a time. The ideal place, a bottleneck, the place on the N bank where there is still an ideal flat area to defend it and where de Bohun was killed, as described by Vita. How historians like Barrow, Duncan, Watson, Cowan and all the others could not see that, is a deep mystery. To make no progress in all that time is just awful: an appalling failure of the task they had taken on. And that is the time!: they swallowed Barbour who wrote in the 14th century and their view is the same as his. It is as if, as soon as appointed historians (with a duty to advance the subject), they suffered instant, permanent, mental paralysis. Since the Kirk was built in 1242 on Main Street, St Ninians, D4 of course the road went along Main Street, the only street on the road from Stirling to Falkirk till 1930 D5. (the road across Spital's bridge went to Airth Jeffreys, map 1746, GB 74, 76.), St Ninians Main Street would be a street with buildings and shops in 1314, a hostelry for sure, because that is the road and the direct line from the Castle to the Ford is obvious, with turns to the Ford itself and back to the straight to make use of the Ford D6. How could there be a bridge elsewhere in 1314? So far out in the country. Who would build and maintain such a bridge and where would it be? D7 Not where Milton Bridge is today: there is a drop of twenty feet at least between one side and the other. D8 That was the second last bridge built because of it. Spital's 1516 and Chartershall 1696 are earlier; Telford's 1819, later. D9

It is of the greatest importance to see that none of the historians ever asked themselves the elementary questions any child would ask. When was the first bridge? Because before that the Ford was the only route. D10 And when was the Kirk built? For that tells you the road from Falkirk to Stirling went along

that street. Why is it certain? Because all the materials for building the Kirk came along that road. D11 The kirk was on the street to save the effort of carrying them off the road. D12 [You begin to see how many decisive insights there are and their importance.] No historian should ever be appointed henceforth who does not instinctively ask the questions necessary to illuminate the subject. That has been part of the problem. They have closed minds that do not ask questions naturally. They soon speculate and then to avoid the consequences, discourage challenge and even encourage the burial of those who do, to protect their own status. Telling lies about the value of these is a natural consequence. **Reformation is essential!** Not just telling lies about the value of outsiders' better work but even about the value of their own. The scholar must never lie to himself about his own work, otherwise he stops work: never gets the actual work necessary, done at all. The one thing that every historian will do about all of this, everything on this website, is to rubbish it because it is what they have been doing all their lives: telling lies about the value of anything that challenges their ignorance and failure. The truth is of no interest to them; only protecting their false view of it. Their meanness and selfishness is paramount. Their status as professional historians comes before everything. That is why mediocrity flourishes in the Scottish History Community. That is why there is no progress.

9. Mathematical Proof and Historical Proof: a comparison

I used to find that an hour lecture of mathematics or mathematical-physics (by anyone) could be summed up as three or four ideas. The theorem about the Infinity of Primes was a favourite of Hardy's. The proof is to assume the contrary: that there is a finite number of primes. Suppose then that the highest prime is P . Construct a new number $Q = 2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \dots \times P + 1$, out of the product of all the primes and add 1 [1 is considered not to be a prime]. This number Q is bigger than P . Also, none of the primes up to and including P divide into Q evenly: there is always a remainder 1. Either Q is prime or it is not.

If Q is prime it is bigger than P . So P is not the greatest prime, contrary to assumption. Q is bigger than P . Thus the assumption that there was a highest prime is false.

If Q is not prime, it is divisible by some prime. And that prime must be greater than any of the numbers in the product including P because none of them including P is a factor of Q . So the factor of Q is bigger than P and it is prime. Thus, P is not the greatest prime. In either case, the hypothesis is false. Thus the number of primes is infinite.

There are four ideas here. The hypothesis, the definition of Q and that Q is not divisible by any of them including P (two cases).^{vi}

How does the proof (here) of the site of the battle of Bannockburn compare with the little proof of Euclid's above about the infinity of primes? The former is far more complex: there are more ideas. A single idea like the defence of the road being at the Ford requires subsidiary insights to justify it: the kirk built on Main Street in 1242, the road being straight except for the move to the Ford and back again, the only place it could be crossed; the fencing along the road

protecting the Royal Game Reserve (2,200 yards, BR 446), the New Park, its length and the distance from the Pelstream to the Ford; the impassability of the burn up and downstream for a mile due to trees, escarpments, often very steep, and the high banks of the burn in many places. The many photos of the burn have to be applied to, references need to be checked. The map needs to be justified and it is. A volume is necessary: in all three books BR, BP, GB. Returning to what Hardy said, the second factor in a mathematical proof is 'the climax of a conventional pattern of propositions, a sequence of propositions whose truth is admitted and which are arranged in accordance with rules.'

What are the rules in mathematics? Hardy did not say. I have never seen them stated. But I do agree that they exist. One is that the statements progress logically. But the logic is not an invariant: the order of statements can vary.^{vii}

1. The History Proof: its logical necessities

The history proof given here has three propositions which are each established using statements from chronicle sources, five, seven and nine sources to prove each proposition. Since there are no contrary sources, the force of the proof of each is strong, invulnerable even: that is a lot of powerful support. That the propositions are all true shows that the Battle was fought in the Carse and even, when the corollaries are included, every necessary insight (there are hundreds), that the battle is understood very completely, not merely the site of it. The proof that the number of primes is infinite reveals it as inevitable; certain. It is impossible that this is not so. The same with the history proof: what has been shown is that the battle was fought in the Carse and in that fashion. It is inconceivable that this victory by the Scots could have been fought anywhere else or in any other way. If it was fought in the Carse, it must have been fought in that way. If it was not fought in the Carse, it would have been lost by the Scots. English heavy cavalry, alone, would have won it. The nature of the Carse: the inviting Knoll in the centre where the King of England could camp and oversee his entire army (proved by Jefferys' map 1746 which shows it GB 74, 76 as well as Roy's kinks in the lade to get round it). It was the best camp site for miles. [Had the Knoll not existed in 1314, the road would not have gone around it and King Edward, Umphraville and Gloucester, would have been unable to see the Scots approach, as Vita, 53,53, Barbour XII 447-459 and Bridlington 48 tell us they did.] The pools of water and the bounding streams so necessary on a midsummer day when the entire army, horses and men, need to drink (GB first map). The Knoll, just out of bowshot of the woods where the Scots slept (map 3 herein). These woods being on a steep, 70ft slope (114' down to 40', mostly) which would, in the dawn, provide a dark background, behind the men marching in silence, mean the Scots were not noticed until they were very close to the English lines and only from the Knoll. The distance between the bounding streams: about 830 yards, the length of the line that the Scots had to defend against a charge of the finest, heaviest and most experienced cavalry in Europe: thousands of them: at least three, probably four thousand. What knight would want to miss

a battle like that, when there was everything to gain and nothing to lose? [There were about 7,000 knights in England then] All they had to do was turn up. They would not be refused; might be rewarded, might even be paid. Four knights even came from Germany. They were all against Scottish peasants who had no comparable cavalry: 500 on small horses and little armour or experience. The English cavalry was enough to win all by themselves. A fact, obvious to everyone. The overconfidence of the English which had them singing, drinking and boasting all night long was inevitable. The heavy rain beforehand that filled the pools and swelled the streams to raging, brown torrents, deep and dangerous to men in armour trying to cross them. Every one of these things is a factor in the outcome of the battle. **Move the site somewhere else and everything changes.** Bruce's genius in seeing what to do, is the difference. The flash that turns the impossible into the inevitable. The 830 yards can be filled with pikemen to imprison the English knights who were bound to occupy the best positions for the foxhunt in the morning. **That distance across the Carse and those bounding streams are essential.** Where else can the Scots imprison the English cavalry where they will choose to be in front? That has to be the place! The only possible place. That most of the English are drunk by morning means they are slow, muddled, incapable and unprepared, do not even notice the Scots in the gloom of dawn against the black background of Balquhiderock Wood, till they are close. That Bruce has marched the Scots very close to their cavalry means they will be easily halted for lack of space and therefore speed, and soon, cavalry no longer. And the 830 yard space will be crammed with stationary horses, piling in behind each other ineffectually, unable to retreat to regroup because of the hordes of infantry, archers and servants forced to camp behind them, out of bowshot of the Wood, trying to see what is happening, running in to fill the empty spaces left by the cavalry.

The technique for setting the pikes is necessary and training for it: imagine if someone slipped? He could bring down the men around him like ninepins, killed by their own pikes. Some of them would be kneeling in pools of water, many would walk through pools.

Bruce knew the English would camp in the Carse. That is where they would always camp, did camp in 1298 and 1304 etc (Edward 1 writes to the Prince of Wales about it). He knew they would be overconfident; knew they would be on holiday and would drink; knew that the knights would claim the best positions for themselves, leaving the infantry and archers to fend for themselves behind the cavalry. That command and control would be deemed unnecessary. He saw that his own cavalry were no match for theirs and decided to dismount them all. That is certain! BR p254; GB 31-33. How could he defeat them on foot? In only one way: by getting very close to them, as close as possible, to deprive them of space to get up speed. **These are the key to the battle.** These and the bounding streams which would be muddy by morning with an army using them, even if there were no pools of water, because it had not rained recently. But he was in luck. It did rain, that year, that summer, and that period was unusually bad for rain. In Ireland a year or

two later, the Scots failed because of the rain and the spoiled crops which left nothing to eat. **WE** are in luck. Because of the pools, it has been possible to understand this entire matter. If there had been no pools that week-end because of no rain, it would have been harder to prove anything. But Barbour knew about the pools and Brut y Tywysogyon knew they were the defining feature of that Carse: pools regularly, every time it rained and the battle was fought among them. Peniarth Ms. 20 p123 [gyfrank yn y *Pollys* in one ms; y kyfranc en y *Polles*, in another, p219, footnote 123, 21 foot of page]

The fact that we can still see the pools every time it rains is confirmation that these two chronicle sources are correct. The zigzag road, Millhall Road, in the Carse, on every map including Roy's tells us their presence was not unusual but regular even in 1314. This Carse has been like this since time immemorial.

All these things, all these factors in the map, in the training, in the character of the English, whom Bruce knew very well, Bruce's main ideas: leading his men on foot to close off the Carse and even getting them up and moving forward, closer still because the English could do nothing about it. What could they do? Confronted out of the dark backdrop of the wood at dawn with thousands of pikemen. Their astonishment is easy to imagine. Bruce saw it, knew it in advance! And had the audacity to act on it.

There are a large number of decisive insights here. What if any of them were different? Those that could be different (the bounding streams and the pools are fixed by the chronicles and the zig zag road and the photos taken of them and how the ground is). What else could be different? The setting of pikes? Marshalling the Scots? The number of Scots? (the number of English, all the English, is clearly very high: over 20,000; much more). If the pikes are not set as described, (butt in the ground by the heel. Vital: the ground not the man takes the force of the equine tank) and aimable with one hand, the men kneeling, pikes sloping forward over the heads and between heads of men in front), then far more men will be killed in the cavalry charge which is unavoidable. But we are told only two Scottish knights were killed (Ross and Viewpont, vipont, now) and they may have been killed in the rout, not before. All Bruce's best fighters would be in the front row. But none may have been killed at all there. They were too close for cavalry to have space to get up speed to kill them. That is what the mathematics of it in GB p300-308 reveals. The lance tip does not reach the front rank until up to 14 pikes strike the equine tank. Marshalling? Bruce must get his men onto the Carse at the cusp of dawn already in position. He has to march them off almost immediately. There is no time to lose. And it must be done in silence. There would be so much noise from the English camp which would be lit up all night like a fair, that, perhaps, silence was not essential from the Scots; yet it would be expected, ordered. But we know the Bannockburn is a vital element in the battle and the Carse and the Knoll and the pools of water. These define the place of battle. And how the Scots and English got into these positions is well understood and explained.

The strength of this proof is precisely that efforts to suggest that certain moves were different are likely to fail. If they were different, the Scots would have lost the battle. If, for example, there had been a Scottish cavalry charge, if they had run at the enemy cavalry, [As Barrow still insisted in 2013] they could not have prevailed. 500 small horses against 3,000 heavily armed horses, twice as tall, would have been defeated by weight of numbers alone. This is a proof; it is certain. That no historians in seven centuries ever came close to understanding it, means they would all have lost the battle. Why? Because they did not believe it was possible to understand it, that the chronicle sources could be translated and combined and statements counted to reveal it, and the ground was too much changed to understand and make a map of the time—when all it took was energy, asking questions, insight and hard work for years. That is why they learnt nothing in seven centuries, were lazy, content to speculate and protected their ‘work’ by telling lies about better work that exposed their errors and obstructed the new publication and dissemination by every conceivable immoral means to save face; but depriving the truth to the People of Scotland which was a crime.

Those historians today who deny the truth of it, would themselves lose the battle if it occurred tomorrow, if they were in command. And their culture of following the speculations of those in control and telling whatever lies are necessary to protect their own errors, will continue and they will make no progress like their authoritarian predecessors who ordered no progress to be made and buried any who made it to save faces. What investigations like this achieve is full understanding of how the battle was won and how others in future can be won. That is a great prize. It tells us that the Scots have no limit on what we can achieve. We are as intelligent, as innovative, as brave and daring as any nation on earth.

2. The value of knowing at last what happened at the battle?

It tells us who we are, what we are capable of, what Bruce and his men did, and what we can all do in future, again. The truth is inspirational. Had this research not been buried by historians with no brains or decency, the ground of the battle area would have been protected, as it should have been. Then, every 24th June, at sunrise, each Scotsman could have taken his children by the hands and led them to repeat the move by Bruce who led his men onto the Carse and across it to set their pikes. And the correct version told quietly as they went. That would have inspired the country. They could have breakfasted on the Knoll (on porridge and bannocks?), imagining, remembering.... Songs could be sung, music played. Other events. Even yet, the battle area can be returned to its former state, as happened at Gettysburg. Bannockburn was Scotland’s finest hour.

A nation’s identity, its very capacity to advance itself and its people and their way of life, is founded on its history, its great men and their achievements. **Up to now, Bruce’s genius has been concealed by the stupidity of the historians who refused to admit their mistakes.** They do not want anyone to know how brilliant Bruce was. Because they can only know if they also know what bad scholars they were for all these centuries.

The British Empire was created partly by young men attending public schools nourished on a diet of classics where the role models were Horatius on the bridge, Themistocles at Salamis, Achilles at Troy and Alexander at Gaugamela, among others like Socrates, Plato, Pericles, Pheidippides, Aeschylus and Euripides, Caesar and Cicero as well as Euclid. Till now, we seemed to depend on Wallace and his huge sword. Now we Scots have Bruce at Bannockburn and can remember and savour his imaginative genius, his intelligence, his bravery, his audacity, his composure, his man-management, his leadership, his fighting skill and his victory. At last we can understand what he achieved. Note: classics, far from being useless, honed memory, taught insight and encouraged our understanding of the Greeks and Romans, how to do as well as they did and even better. We British learned from their empires to create our own.

This medieval history proof has three propositions (more could have been stated and proved: the two proofs in BP mentioned just before this extended third proof have 25 and 18 propositions, respectively. GB has more proofs, some longer and better). The truth of each of the propositions is established. In the third proof, 9 chronicle sources are used (along with the justified maps and the ground and the photos and the other maps like Roy's and OS 1860 and revisions, and numerous others all over the country, investigating cases of pols, puls, pals and pows (there are no cases of polles now). The security of the proof can be seen by questioning: what would it take to falsify it? If there were nine different newly discovered chronicle sources which produced a different result, we might wonder if, after all, it was correct. Especially if they all were written within days of the battle. The probability of that is zero. The likelihood of finding one new source is also zero after seven centuries. However, if one were discovered it would almost certainly confirm what the other nine have already confirmed. That is a secure position to reach. Certain things are inevitable: the road from Falkirk to Stirling in 1314 went across the Ford. It could not go anywhere else because there was no bridge until 1516. If by some miracle there was such a bridge, it is quite certain that Bruce would have destroyed it before the English arrived. This alone makes it certain that Bruce defended the road at the Ford, because so few knights (3 or 4 at most) could cross over at one time. That the Kirk was on the road at Main Street, St Ninians, makes the existence of the road across the Ford certain. No other road from Stirling to Falkirk across Main Street and the across the Ford existed until about 1930. [A crescent was put in beside Main Street then, W side] Apart from the bend to the Ford and back again once across the burn, the road is very straight, heading for the Castle. So that is unarguable. That the English camped in the Carse after losing all the battles of the first day is clear from Barbour's Bruce and Brut y Tywysogyon and from the pools of water on the Carse, regularly, which have been photographed on several occasions and these are clearly **an invariant, defining feature** for that ground because of the zig zag road (Millhall Road) that crosses the carse and is shown on every worthy map that exists, including the earliest map:

Roy's. [Pont's equivalent is useless, shows nothing of value (a decisive insight)]. That the English camped in the Carse the night before the battle tells us why Bruce moved out into the Carse and marched his men on foot across it. To win the battle and to do so on foot, as every source but one (Barbour) tells us repeatedly (Trokelowe tells us five times), makes it inevitable that Bruce meant to pen the English in their camp between the bounding streams which were in torrent because the existence of the pools tells us it had just rained heavily. Why were they all on foot? Because they intended to get as close as possible to the cavalry lines which had formed first in the best positions for the expected foxhunt of Scottish rebels in the morning. And they had worked out how to defend a cavalry charge. That was new! Bruce's doing, as usual. Several sources tell us the English charged the Scots: Lanercost 208 and Scalacronica 56 mention the pikes and lances splintering. It follows that the cavalry were in front and we know why. Overconfidence had made the English believe cavalry alone was enough. So the archers and infantry and servants were behind them. All that can be seen in the sources. Bruce, who knew them well, could foresee everything. And the drunkenness and drinkhail and wassail that went on all night. Overconfidence. That is why they were taken by surprise still unbreakfasted in their camp, even unmounted when he arrived beside them. The Scots did not stop to pray, there were no priests in their finery distributing wine and wafers. Impossible. The Scots knelt, not to pray but to set their pikes and having done so and observed their disarray, Bruce got them up and marched them closer and then reset them within yards of the English lines. Why? Because he was alert and daring and brave and he valued his men's lives. None of that can be doubted, given the four sources, each one of them a clergyman, who mention praying. There would be no bugle call. Even the bugler would be drunk. If there was one, no one paid attention, for they were all mostly drunk. Edward II was an incompetent king, exercising no control and no respect. The English eventually charged, one at a time, like the day before at St Ninians, when ready, as individuals, in search of personal glory (not as a team) and easily halted. Then pulled down and slain. Successive lines of cavalry piled into the back of those already halted and caused no damage to the kneeling Scots who could not be seen over the heads of the knights on their tall horses by the archers who, pressed together, could not see to aim properly and when some shot their own men in the back stopped shooting. Arrows aimed high fell uselessly on Scottish helmets and did no damage. It all makes perfect sense. Could it have been different? The streams, the Knoll and the pools of water define the Carse and what Bruce intended in marching his men across it. That they are all on foot is a masterstroke, seen in BR on page 44 in the year 2000 and before that in Quill in 1993! p69. That single fact itself determines everything else and makes it certain. From it comes a list of questions beginning with: Why were they all on foot? And the answer is because they intended to march close to the English lines to nullify the power of their cavalry by depriving it of space, for then it was cavalry for too short a time to have the usual powerful effect. The tip of the lance did not reach the front

kneeling row before up to 14 pikes hit the knight. That is the effect of pikes being 15ft, GB 305-309, **butt in the ground to take the momentum, not the man or his chest**, and even break. It saved Scottish lives (only two knights killed). Why else were they on foot, faced with thousands of experienced, heavy cavalry? And no one, no Englishman, and no historian ever, in seven centuries, understood what had taken place and what the creative ideas were that made the victory possible. Secure? I believe it is. What contrary conclusion is possible?

3. 'Propositions arranged in accordance with rules'? As Hardy says in his paper. These various paragraphs and all those within the proof following the three propositions stated, obey the rules of English and of logic. Everything fits. I call that a proof in Medieval History. It does not have the economy of Hardy's favourite simple proof but not all proofs in mathematics are simple.

In 1868, there were 38 subcategories of mathematics. In 1979, approximately 3,400.^{viii} Now? Over 10,000? No one is an expert at the cutting edge of more than a small number of subcategories. Thus, the rules of every procedure of every subcategory (if they are slightly different) are understood by no one. Some proofs in some subcategories extend to hundreds of pages. Some (like the first proof of the four colour theorem) are even hundreds of pages of computer print-out. Thus, the proof above in medieval history is not as complicated as many proofs in maths. Nor is there only one proof in maths. The proof Fermat saw when he wrote of his famous theorem, that 'the margin was not large enough to contain it' (if we believe him) was very different from Andrew Wiles' proof in 1995/6, for that includes concepts and notation unavailable in the 17th century. Every sub category of mathematics has its own original concepts and notational advances.

4. How many sources are involved in this proof? Not just the 9 chronicle sources. There is the ground itself, the best source of all, though no historian has ever realised it because they believe it is too much changed to understand. Not so! When you are not lazy but dedicated and determined, as you should be, having such a major event to save from the stupidity of centuries by historians, and have the time to spend years on it, a fully justified map of the battle area can be done. It has been done and confirmed by several people, some of them spending years at it, though much less than the author. It was pitiful that Oliver and Pollard should have decided four chronicles were enough to 'deal with it' in their films. They had the road defended in the middle of the Dryfield about where Christison put it, defending a front of about a mile. How very stupid! Childish! When the Ford is about five yards across, maximum, where few knights at one time can cross over. That is the place to defend! Scotland's Thermopylae. Not to see that, is so memorable it should be engraved on their souls. They were sent all the books years before but never made any progress in two visits to the battle area. The effort of reading them would have been beyond their intellectual level. They did no preparation for their early visits. The producer of their third film, Falco Boermans, bought copies of BR and GB before they started 'work'. But they

were too busy doing TV work etc in other places to do any real work on the battle. A class of small children digging a trench inches deep, as if anything useful would emerge (that was not planted there: remember the musket ball mysteriously found at Otterburn? There would have been some in the museum nearby, as the smiles of locals suggested)? That is why the question above is valuable. They do not know what work is. None of the historians have ever known. Listen and you might understand. In GB 416, 'I am grateful to Mrs Ciannait Tait of Polmoodie (who, asked if the burn dried up, replied: 'Yes, the heron loves it then,' GB 176, (fishing is easier when the burn is just pools: pol =pool); Mr Murray Irving MBE of Hallyholm Farm, Kilstay (near Drummore) GB 178/9 where the Pulwhinnrick burn is, a huge pool in a burn that does not cross the shore usually, because of low water pressure in a peninsula of very low hills (Rhynns of Galloway): Pul means pool; Mr Watson (aged 89 when I met him) of Polharrow House GB 171 (present on the Estate in 1954 before the Hydro work was done) remembered 'the trout dying in the pools,' (because the water level in Loch Harrow had fallen below the exit level of the burn which comes out of the Loch), Mr Joseph Borek, (twenty years ago, a Polish soldier who stayed on) of Main Street, St Ninians, BR 325/6, who lived there in 1945 when the Pelstream was culverted under Main Street for the first time and the culvert was too narrow to contain the stream and blew a waterspout forty feet high (showing the force of the Pelstream after heavy rain. It was replaced with one much bigger.) Miss Margaret MacGregor, formerly of Alloa Inch, a 100 acre island in the R Forth, on which she grew up, farming and fishing, who sent me info about a tide of 26ft 10 inches at Alloa in 1960, whose knowledge of the tides on the Forth is exceptional and confirmed the pronunciation of pow as 'poo', just as I had found it in Airth and Powfoulis which in Pont's 16th century map is spelled Pofoulis, confirmed in other maps of his of places with the spelling 'pu' (map 33 eg). Why was a 26ft tide on the Forth at Alloa important? Await instruction. This one covered over the island. A matter of concern to her, living there. The list goes on and on. Mr William Stevenson of Falinn who was at Stirling High when the only pool ever on the Dryfield was first put there for the biology dept, and Mr Taylor and his sister of the one house on Gillies Hill, in the forest centre. All these people and many others, **all** acknowledged in BR, BP, GB, **are sources**. What they told me is invaluable, made it possible to understand how things really are and demolish Barrow's false theory about pow being stream and Duncan's translation of pulis as streams in Barbour's Bruce. About sixty modern OS maps have been studied and as many older OS ones. A hundred others all older of different things in Scotland. Maps of places with the word pow in maps of a century ago. 1911 is a good year for such maps. Documents galore, some in Latin, which I have translated and got help with because medieval Latin is harder than classical, especially if abbreviated because word endings are non-rigorous. What this shows is the dedication necessary to solve problems as difficult as these, the time spent: over twenty years full time (some of the above will have died); the amount of travel far from home and the expense and the effort. Because of it all, one's insight is

developed by the very excitement of the discoveries made. For the work had to be done because Professors Barrow and Duncan had fouled up very badly and defended their ignorance by the worst possible obstruction at every stage, refusing to admit their errors. Their stupid mistakes in translating pulis and polles had to be corrected, along with all their other errors. The proof of the battle site is immediate as soon as they are. Overcoming their gravitas and the beliefs of so many of the public who have such faith in words like 'professor' without ever understanding that it is no guarantee of knowledge, intellect, insight, least of all, decency. They can be relied on only to defend their mediocrity which is truly appalling. They are not scholars, not people you can trust. They let the country down, for twenty years, that you can rely on. Indeed, they let it down for seven centuries, for their understanding has not progressed since. They have been indoctrinated with drivel, indoctrinated everyone else with it and that is all they have offered and insist on it being preferred, despite its being drivel. **Just because it is their drivel.** The whole community is indoctrinated with the same rubbish.

10. A short Proof

A version of the history proof can be given which is much shorter. BP and GB have many of these GB 47, 63, 146, 147, 158, 162/3, 166, 182/3/4, 211/2, 220/222, 239/241, 273/286. The above proof is longer.

What is the virtue of a long proof like the one here (above)? While making it, I deliberately included more of Geoffrey Le Baker's account where he describes the overconfidence, drunkenness and singing of the English the night before the battle. Why? Because it mattered to him. He thought it was important. It is easy to cut it down and lose the flavour of his reaction which is extreme. Overconfidence, 'drinkhail and wassail', define the condition of the English army and tell us they were paying no attention to the Scots whom they had all written off as dead men, fit for nothing but a foxhunt of rebels, the next day. It is best to read all of that. However, the negative is that because there is so much in the proof, the certainty and force of it is lessened. Baston too mentions the drunkenness, (Vol VI Bk XII 76-78,160-161,169-170) so it is confirmed. Trokelowe also says this on BR 195 and Vita on 179 (omitted in the above proof). Thus reading the whole passage does give what a short proof alone cannot.

A short proof with only the essential elements could now be given with all 9 chronicle sources crammed together for the sake of focus on the main ideas:

I. The English camped in the Carse the night before the battle.

- 1.Barbour 1377: The English camped in the Carse the night before the battle because of the pools of water
- 2.Brut y Tywysogyon 1314: The battle took place among pools of water
- 3.The Carse is enclosed so it has pools of water regularly and uniquely. GB P146
- 4.Scalacronica 1314: The English debouched onto a flat plain with pools of water: the Carse. The three sources above confirm the pools of water.

5. Trokelowe 1314: This most deadly battle was fought near Stirling Castle at a moor (flat plain) near the Bannock burn which several sources admit the English crossed into. eg

6. Lanercost 1314: The English had shortly before crossed a great ditch called the Bannock burn into which the tide flows and now wanted to recross it (after camping and being attacked in the morning).

7. Scotichronicon 1314: Most Englishmen were killed between their camp and the Bannock burn

Seven sources confirm this proposition.

II. The Scots occupied the Dryfield of Balquhiderock the night before the main battle.

1. Vita 1314: On Sunday, the Scots were seen straggling into their woods at the entry to the New Park, Milton Ford. Robert Bruce killed de Bohun with an axe. On the same day a sharp action was fought, in which the earl of Gloucester was unhorsed (also at the Ford), and Robert de Clifford disgracefully routed (by Moray, near St Ninians), and many were killed on either side. The day being spent, the whole army met at the place where it was to bivouac that night, the Carse p51. The Scots won on Day 1 and retained the Dryfield.

2. Barbour 1377: The Scots waited in curved lines at the entry to the New Park the Ford, and Bruce killed de Bohun on the north bank (once he had crossed over the burn). The English withdrew, Bk 12 68-72. Moray defended the road at St Ninians near the Kirk. Clifford avoided the New Park and headed for the Castle BK 11 528-542 in open ground, stopped by Livilands bog, found a route up to the plateau and waited for Moray, attacked him and then was driven off Bk 12 130-142 (to camp in the Carse as arranged, a few to the castle). The Scots won on Day 1 and retained the Dryfield.

3. Scalacronica 1314: The Scots had blocked the roads in the wood. A knight (de Bohun) was killed by Bruce with a hand axe. Clifford and Beaumont went around the wood towards the castle, keeping to the open ground (of the Carse). Moray hearing that his uncle (Bruce) had repulsed the English at the Ford (p54), then engaged Clifford's and Beaumont's knights. The Scots 'utterly routed the squadron of the two lords', p54. The Scots won on Day 1 (at the Ford and just north of St Ninians) and retained the Dryfield.

4. Trokelowe 1314: Some of the English, riding out in front of the Scots formations, challenged them ferociously but they killed many nobles on that Sunday. As a result, the English were exasperated and firmly resolved to be avenged or to be defeated on the following day. Thus, the Scots won on the first day and held the Dryfield.

5. Lanercost 1314: The Scots did not interfere until they [The English] were far ahead of the main body, when they showed themselves, and cutting off the king's advanced guard from the middle and rear columns, they..killed some of them and put the rest to flight. The Scots won on Day 1 and held the Dryfield.

Five sources show that the Scots won all their battles and therefore retained the Dryfield.

III The Scots advanced on the English in their camp in the Carse soon after dawn on the second day. [Note: If the Scots are headed anywhere it is out of the woods on the Dryfield towards the English in their camp. See the maps]

1. Vita 1314: p52 'Robert Bruce led his whole army out from the wood. [**They are in the Carse, then**] About forty thousand he brought with him, in three divisions; and not one of them was on horseback, but each was furnished with light armour...They had axes at their sides and carried pikes in their hands. They advanced like a thick-set hedge, and such a phalanx could not easily be broken. Seeing the Scottish forces attacking rapidly, [**They are approaching the English in their camp**] Gloucester dashed forward alone and was slain by Douglas. (p53) When those with the king saw the earl's line was broken, the king was led off the field and the whole army dispersed...a certain ditch (Bannock burn) entrapped many of them.' (p54) [Denholm-Young's trans]

2. Scalacronica 1314: 'At sunrise on the morrow [The Scots] marched out of the wood in three divisions of infantry. They directed their course boldly upon the English army...They [**The English in their camp**] mounted in great alarm, [they are in their camp] for they were not accustomed to fight on foot; whereas the Scots had taken a lesson from the Flemings, who had before that at Courtrai defeated on foot the power of France, p55. The aforesaid Scots came in line of schiltroms and attacked the English columns, which were jammed together and could not operate against them [the Scots], so direfully were their horses impaled upon the pikes. p56 **The troops in the English rear fell back upon the ditch of Bannock burn**, tumbling one over the other.' [Maxwell's trans.] The Scots approached the English in their Camp in the Carse.

3. Trokelowe 1314: 'Robert the Bruce, on foot with his entourage, went ahead of his whole army, so that..no one would think of running away...(Once in position): 'Emboldened, they [**The Scots**] awaited the arrival of the English without fear, resolutely prepared to live or die, to conquer or be conquered, for the defence of their side, regarding their death in this event as martyrdom and their wounds as salvation. On their side, they were all on foot: picked men, very courageous, properly armed with very sharp axes and other weapons of war (pikes) with their shields tightly locked in front of them, forming an impenetrable formation. They completely abandoned their horses, avoiding the danger which had befallen them in the battle of Falkirk, where the Scottish cavalry, seeing the large numbers of English advancing in such good order, took to flight and left foot soldiers to die in the field.' Annales p84, BR191,192. The Scots moved into position in front of the English camp and awaited the charge of their cavalry.

4. Lanercost 1314: 'All the Scots fell on their knees to repeat Pater noster, commending themselves to God and seeking help from heaven; after which they advanced boldly against the English.' p207 (Imagine it: the Scots are close and they stop to pray? Impossible. They were setting their pikes. The only thing on their

minds. They knelt down because that was the way to defend a cavalry charge: the monk writing this thinks kneeling means praying. The main point is that the Scots get up and move forward out of the Dryfield. Maxwell's trans. Once they have advanced far enough for Bruce, they will set their pikes again and await the charge.

5. **Le Baker 1329**:- 'The King their leader [Bruce], having forbidden any to mount a warhorse, the Scottish army was divided as customary into groups not far from the aforementioned ditch (the Bannock burn)..... p7,8; BR p198. [**Le Baker is telling us the battle took place in ground beside the Bannock burn**]. 'Of those killed in the above fight a considerable number were accounted for by a troop of archers of no assigned position; formerly, they would be set behind the armed men whereas the custom now is to station them on the flanks... When they saw **the Scots press forwards fiercely**....some of them shot their arrows up into the air only for them to come down uselessly among the enemy's helmets.' The English archers have been given no assigned position and are behind the cavalry wherever they could find a space. So they cannot see, over the heads of their cavalry on six foot high horses, the Scots, who are kneeling with their pikes set and the English archers are even hemmed in by people cramming forward to see what is happening, making the loading of arrows and aiming, even more difficult. Some English knights are shot in the back. There would be screams and the archers would stop shooting, ordered to or not.

6. **Baston 1314**: 'The English fighters look expectantly for Scots whom they may do to death – **Scots no longer remote but close at hand.**' Scotichronicon Vol VI BKXII p373 160,161 The Scots have left the Dryfield and advanced towards the English camp.

Baston 1314: '**Rushing down, (from the Dryfield) the raging Scottish fighters advance on foot,** extracting ruinous payment for what they expend.' (ibid Bk XII 169,170) The Scots have left the Dryfield and advanced towards the English camp.

7. **Scotichronicon 1314**: Vol VI p357 'The king of Scots laid low.. the English and routed their cavalry along with their king. There is a stream called the Bannock which is witness to this, in which lay the drowned bodies of those who had taken to flight.' Because they are fleeing across the Bannock burn, we know they have been fighting in the Carse where the English camped, line 3 -6.

p359, line 40: 'The Forth buries many men well-equipped with arms and horses.'

p359, line 61: 'The muddy Bannock holds those whose names we do not know. '

p359, line 73-75: '**Between the stony stream and the obstruction of their camp the treacherous English people come to grief** as a result of their own dishonest conduct. The English are killed mainly between the camp around the Knoll and the Bannock Burn.

8. **Brut y Tywysogyon [1314]**: 'On the eve of St John (23rd June 1314) and on that day (24th) occurred the encounter in the Pools, when the earl of Gloucester was killed with many Englishmen besides slain by the Scots and the King of England fled the field.' [Peniarth [Ms20 p123, GB 159]. Thus, this refers to the battle of Bannock burn which was fought in the Carse on the 24th June 1314 and the English were defeated, the earl of Gloucester slain and many Englishmen besides and King Edward II fled the field. **The Battle is in the Carse among the pools.**

9. **Barbour [1377]:** ‘And when the King of England saw the Scots take the hard field so openly and on foot he was surprised and said, ‘What will yon Scots fight?’ ‘Yes, indeed, sir,’ said a knight, Sir Ingram Umphraville, ‘Forsooth now, sir, I see it is the most surprising sight I ever saw, for the Scots have taken on the might of England, to give battle on the plain hard field.’ [Bk XII p471, 447-459; BR p243]. **The Scots have astonished the King and Umphraville who can see them approach because they are up on the Knoll 60 ft above the Carse floor.**

Thus nine sources tell us that the Scots advanced into the Carse to fight the English in their camp.

There have already been numerous insights about why they did so and what methods they used when they got into the position they desired. All three propositions are true. Numerous statements in nine sources confirm it. This is a proof. Certainty is achieved! Thus:

Conclusion: the battle was fought in the Carse.

Note: No historian has ever assembled a collection of chronicle sources like these before. Some appeared for the first time in BR in the year 2000. I do not think any historian is even aware of their existence, most of them. It would require from them work that there has never been any sign they were capable of. Or the value of assembling them in this way, this form and this style. But then, none of them believed that a proof was possible. So it was never attempted in seven centuries till BR, BP, GB, GS, BGB and Bannockburn: the Poem which are full of them.

11.Question: **some will ask: is it right to condemn historians when they may be involved in deciding if this research is of value?**

Answer: **They must be condemned!** Their failure to make any progress in seven centuries, which is a fact because Barbour wrote *The Bruce* in 1377/8 and they have not deviated from his view of it in all the centuries since. That makes it essential! The primary duty. They ‘all believe’ 6,000 Scots beat 20,000 English and a Scottish cavalry charge drove the English archers from the field and a group of Small Folk seen on some distant hill made the English so fearful that they took it for a reserve Scottish army and fled. Professor Duncan wrote this to me in the 1990s. Watson agreed in her report in 2001, siting the battle where Barrow put it (and her schoolteacher!^{ix}) ; and Barrow still agreed with it in 2013 (the Classic edition of his *Robert Bruce*, p273). Barrow’s theory on p277 about pol meaning pow meaning stream is demolished herein and in GB Ch VI (as is Duncan’s translation of pulis as streams). Cowan agreed with them in his booklet on the battle published in the Scotsman c 2007. All this in spite of BR,BP,GB,BSB, Bannock burn: the Poem, all published in the years 2000,2004/5,2012,2013,2014, respectively, which utterly disprove everything they believe, including the fact that they believe it is impossible to prove anything about the battle because it is too long ago and the ground too much changed. Not so! Further, they all lied continually to protect themselves from far superior work (this research) which proved everything and opposed the publication of papers from it which would have shown them up. **The solution of the Bannock burn Problems** (which matters: our identity as Scots is enhanced by it and we will be inspired by it for all time henceforth. Every young Scot, as never before, will understand what Bruce achieved and why he did so and have a clear role

model to follow) **is even less important than the reformation of the Scottish Medieval History Community** which must destroy for all time its culture of never criticising the work of historians in control (speculation and nothing more), on pain of burial by them: refusal of degrees, awards, funding, publication and promotions. And the systematic telling of lies to protect them from new discoveries, such as this research has produced over the last thirty years, which is a complete solution of the Bannock burn Problems. That is why these unexpected moves are necessary. The Historians of the Scottish Medieval History Community (Bannockburn group) have made no progress in seven centuries. Why are they employed? They are a waste of the country's money. Their only action is to obstruct original discoveries and proofs which they were never competent to do at any time. Four mentioned here on this website make that clear. Some articles herein have detailed their errors. Scotland needs to be rid of them. They have held up progress. Buildings have been erected within yards of where Bruce slew de Bohun. Why? Because of their stupidity. Selfishness, status seeking and self-protection. Their ignoring this work and dismissing its value is sour grapes. They would rather it had never been done! They have no regard for the truth and no aptitude for finding it. All they care about is themselves. How they are perceived.^x That culture approves new appointments. Its very existence means that these will be, above all, no threat to those in control. Thus the absence of progress is guaranteed to continue because only mediocrities are appointed by mediocrities. With the right people in command Scottish History can progress. As matters stand, the wrong ones are being appointed. Note: if they were not condemned, they would never admit that an outsider had proved it. They have no decency, are mean spirited and obstructive. They put themselves first. Not the country, not the good of the people of Scotland, still less, the TRUTH.

William Wallace Cunningham Scott, BA,BSc,MEd,FIMA,FSAScot, 19th Sept 2019

12.The appointment of Scottish History professors. What is essential is the ambition to advance our knowledge of Scottish History. They must believe it is possible, beyond the speculations which have bedevilled the subject up to now. History is not merely a narrative. It requires the solution of problems. An event like a battle needs to be understood, fully. Where did it take place? What actions are involved which made the outcome inevitable. No one who is to be a professor of the subject should be appointed who has not a track record of success in advancing the subject. He or she, should already believe this and possess the procedures necessary for making progress, taking it beyond what it has been before. **All the errors listed here in this research and elsewhere and on this website (by four professors and other historians) should be understood, accepted and be part of that person's education so that these kinds of mistakes do not recur.** The most important move to alter for all time the culture of no criticism or challenge of authorities, the telling lies by them all to bury work that does so, is to make all these errors, common knowledge. For seven centuries, Bannockburn has seen no progress of any kind! That one novel procedure in BR p254 (et prior) is the key to solving a huge number of problems, issue by issue, decisively (in this case) initiating the route to the complete discovery of the truth about the battle. That no historian

noticed its supervenient value in twenty years is a phenomenal confirmation of the stupidity of them all.

What does progress mean? The word 'pulis' in Barbour Vol 2 (Early Eng Text Soc, 2002) see GB p187 (which has the page) was correctly translated in 1888 by WW Skeat, Professor of Anglo Saxon at Cambridge as pools. **Mistranslated**, 'stream' with not a shred of evidence, by Duncan in 1998 (Cannongate ed of Barbour's Bruce) was not progress but **regression**, confusion, **repeatedly demolished** in BR, BP, GB etc without admission by Duncan who continually acted as if it were still correct. The words polles or pol or pow in Barrow's Robert Bruce, 3rd ed 211-212, 4th ed 276-277, taken to be equivalent in meaning, is not progress. No evidence was given at all. It was clearly mistaken, regressive and confusing, though demolished in BR, BP and GB without admission by Barrow at any time. Pol=pal=pow=polle=pool. It never means stream. These mistakes **held up progress**. Correct them, and the site of battle is immediate. Note: no one saw this in 1888 or 1952 or between or until the year 2000 it appeared in BR.

If there is no such track record because of the culture of speculation and ignorance, as if it were a sine qua non, together with the intellectual dishonesty that alone preserves it by obstructing the truth, then tests must be devised to ensure that the prospective professor is of a new mould: honourable, open minded, instinctively questioning and showing zealous energy and determination in the pursuit of the fullest possible answers, no matter from whence they come. The Truth must once again be the holy grail it used to be. Not the idiot speculations of history professors with no talent for discovery. Of course advances are likely to come from outside the subject, as so often before. We recall that Newton lost his groats at Trinity College, laboured in isolation for twenty years, but became the greatest scientific mind the world ever knew. Einstein was last in his class and got the lowliest of jobs in a patent office and Ramanujan was an unqualified clerk in Madras who had failed university, before Hardy received the letter of a lifetime from him, full of new theorems, and transported him to Trinity where he was soon an F.R.S. and the finest mind since Newton. And yet, for five years, **by almost every fellow at Trinity, Ramanujan was viewed as a wog**, someone who should not be taking up space there or get a bursary because he did not deserve it. 'You cannot do it, you are not capable,' they were saying. How wrong they were! Hardy and Littlewood alone saw the genius. When these events are understood, fully, the people of the country understand what places should be celebrated and protected from building in the future. They will be inspired by it and likely to develop with greater confidence because it will be founded upon traditions of genius and courage. Something we do not have at present. Those moves of Bruce are world class. The History community does not want anyone to know it. **They prefer the truth to be hidden because they could not find it.**

Despite the work of this research in BR, the Council Planning head G. Thomson arranged to build along the road of 1314 and even, after everything had been proved in BP 2004/5, to allow erection of a huge building within 25yards of the place where Robert Bruce, King of Scots, killed Sir Henry de Bohun on the first day of the Battle of Bannockburn. That was a gross act of sacrilege. Thomson's actions were deliberate: to ignore the work which proved the battle occurred in the Carse, because he wanted to build there. He commissioned a historian, Fiona Watson, to

'determine the site', as if it had not already been determined which it had. [Anyone who could prefer her report to BR is an idiot, pure and simple]. The Council were sent a copy of *Bannockburn Revealed* (BR) published in July 2000. That is what prompted the commission of Watson to find a different result. [Easy for her, since she never could read and absorb its contents.] She ought never to have been appointed because she was incompetent to deal with what had already been proved in BR] Copies of the others: BP and GB were also sent and given to some of the council-run libraries in and around Stirling, such as the one in Bannockburn. BR also. BR is a hardback of over 450 pages with 100 illustrations, most of them in colour. They are necessary to prove the case. The work is nothing but proof from start to finish. It is by an author with three university degrees and two fellowships and is therefore a serious work of academic history. It should have been read with respect. Watson was known to favour the Dryfield, where Professor Barrow had sited the battle. That is why she was chosen to 'determine the site.' She determined nothing. Decided it was beyond her and tried to establish a consensus, as if that was good enough. Of course it is not. [She still favoured Barrow's site: said so at the public meeting in Bannockburn H.S. on 28.2.2001, reported in Stirling Observer; as her report agrees] She was obliged to deal with what BR had proved. That was beyond her. Of course it is correct. That is what proof means. This sort of action by a Council Planning Head who wants to build on an important historic site and tries to find a historian to combat the work that shows it, must never happen again.

The publication of *Bannockburn Revealed* in the year 2000 produced no reaction in Professor Duncan who read it and acted as if his errors (eg failing to translate and use the actual letter of Edward II written on 28th November 1313, BR Ch 10, esp pp115-117, which meant his paper 'War of the Scots' was rubbish: the truce was a full year, not three months because the date of the battle was known by Edward more than seven months before. The date 24th June 1314 is in the letter, not in the summary he used; and mistranslating pulis in Barbour's Bruce, as streams) **had never been shown**; and from Professor Barrow, BR Ch 9, (his errors are too numerous to catalogue again) who wrote to say that he thought that shading in the Roy maps meant high ground, the only comment to explain his refusal to support an election as FRHistS, are a clear sign that the Scottish Medieval History community is in an appalling state of dishonesty to cover their own mediocrity. All they care about is themselves. The truth they wish to conceal because they had no aptitude and no intention of trying to find it. That culture is still to be seen in those who survive them. They had never seen most of the documents; never studied important ones they had seen, missing essentials, took their fixed view as reason enough to dismiss alternatives based on the documents cited, which they had never seen. They had no idea of the work necessary to understand anything. The entire community is ignorant of most of the work shown herein.

The errors of historians listed and described in other articles herein: **proved**, that is what counts: they really are howlers!— Involve ignorance of many elementary things: collecting every chronicle source, getting them translated, if necessary by paying someone because his or her own facility with Latin or Norman French is not good enough. That two sources had never been translated in any book until they were in BR (with all the others in the 14th century) is a catastrophe. Barrow and Duncan

ought to have been ashamed and shamed by other historians because of it, when they were not. The sheer absence of shame is criminal. They did not deserve to be professors in our best universities. A map of the battle area in 1314 should have been made carefully and fully justified in a volume of book length. Barrow's map occurred after a two day walk over the six square miles which he thought a lot. He never returned, refused to be shown. It is useless: full of errors. Impossible to understand Bruce's brilliant move. The Roy maps and every other relevant map should have been studied carefully. Barrow refused discussion, because he could not keep his end up. He had never been back since those two days in 1965. Maps from all over Scotland are necessary: they explain the things that Barrow did not even scratch the surface of. He knew of the existence of the Roy maps, but it never occurred to him to study them. He could never admit that they reveal the fact that Bannockburn was not even a village by 1750, still less, a place in 1314. The village in 1750 was at Newmarket. He read it, I mentioned it. He had nothing to say. [The only thing I ever remember him reply to that sort of uncomfortable fact was: 'Roy's map is not accurate.' As if that is good enough. Roy is a genius; his maps are brilliant as to details. See GB red 26: the disappearing stream near Cambusbarron; p87-90. That stream is a foot wide and an inch deep in ordinary weather, miles from anywhere in a wood. Genius! That stream is actually shown better by Roy than on the current OS Map. The house at Newmarket set back from the site line! What mapmaker would not just draw a straight line? This is made in 1750! Not to know this, means you have not read it carefully with the other maps, like OS 1860.] Go and look. GB red 23 shows it. Roy drew it because that was what he saw. Why could Barrow not admit it when he saw it in BR in the year 2000? On plate 30b. The clear evidence that Bannockburn was only a stream in 1314, not a place even in 1750. Three houses 150 yards apart, one in another world down a steep hill, do not make a village. The village was at Newmarket. There was no village at Bannockburn until Telford's bridge in 1819, because it bridged the very steep escarpments on both sides (which a horse and cart could hardly manage, especially in icy weather) for the first time. He wasn't willing to be corrected. He wanted to be the authority and was prepared to act as if he was, even with the evidence in front of his eyes that he had failed. Just as both he and Duncan, ignored the work (this work) which showed up their shortcomings as scholars. Scholars should never be like that. You have to be glad when you are shown to be in error. At least you are nearer the truth than you were. The idea that Barrow, because he was a professor, did not need to provide evidence for his idiotic theory that pow=polle=pol= stream in the various editions of his 'Robert Bruce', is astonishing. How did he get into that condition? His academic life was nothing but speculation. And it never occurred to him to investigate anything fully. Of course he did not realise that it does work, if the work is sufficient. Two days walking the ground was never going to be enough. I believe it took me about 700 days in a little over 20 years plus some more, some of it a whole day's journey from Bannockburn at unaffordable expense. [I am reminded that once c2004, I applied for a grant from the Carnegie people. Barrow would scotch that. Who else would be asked?] I did apply to do a Phd at Edinburgh University, my alma mater, a year or so later, where he was Professor Emeritus. Boardman, a historian, Dean, I think, wrote to say that the subject [Bannockburn] 'was not suitable'. Cornwell, years later, got a

Phd from Yale for one on the same subject. Considering how much I have discovered that is new and correct, this is laughable, pitiful. They stop the one person with the insight to solve the problems and has shown it in BR, to keep their speculations safe from a more acute, dedicated and determined mind from queering their pitch. Duncan's obituary in The Herald contained an interesting remark: that he was a man who always responded to questions and would admit his mistakes. The exact reverse is true. He was the cause of a paper on maps being refused on the grounds that the Knoll was a newly created Council dump. He did not know about Jeffery's map showing it in 1746 or Roy's, where the kinks in the mill lade reveal the Knoll in 1750 (and would not be told or check the citations). But that was not the problem: it was all the photos of pools in the Carse in the paper. These were inconvenient to one who had translated pulis as streams in the Carse in his edition of Barbour's Bruce when there never have been streams there on any map. GB p421 has some valuable detail on this. And pulis is the only word mistranslated among hundreds with the same ending!

My work in this subject will continue. There are questions I should investigate, procedures I should develop, because I can. It is my duty. **My abiding perception about the history community is the basic refusal to address discontinuities pointed out to them, as if, coming from outside, they could not be valid. That is gross stupidity; and the telling of lies to protect their speculations when they are demolished: obstruction of publications and reviews because they would lose face.** The fact that Barrow could get all these copies of The Genius of Bannockburn (GB) withdrawn from Oxfam shops where they were selling for a fiver (twenty in three weeks, in Perth alone) shows the lengths that he was prepared to go to cover up his rotten theory and his bad scholarship full of errors. Bannockburn Revealed was a very different kind of book, never seen before. Where, before, was there a history book full of argument that rated all the arguments and established that many were alpha plus: certain? Nothing like it had been seen in seven centuries. Yet none of the professors has ever said a good word about it. That should tell you what they are like. **You can only get approval if you are mediocre enough to qualify.** That many things were proved there, should have alerted scholars to study them carefully and adjust their prejudices. That did not happen. Two professors, Barrow and Duncan, were shown to have made embarrassing mistakes. They made sure these never came to light, got the book 'never mentioned' [as Professor Watson admitted in Dundee, after a lecture there] as well as unreviewed in any journal under their control. That behaviour is unacceptable. Every person in Scotland needs to know this. Money is wasted on people whose only interest is status and self-protection. That is why no progress has been made in seven centuries: why Barbour's Bruce is still, even twenty years after the publication of BR, regarded as the single source that is the authority on the battle, despite its being written over sixty years after it, when half a dozen English sources are clearly superior because they were written within days.^{xi} Worse, the history that has been discovered and proved that would inspire the nation for every generation henceforth has been buried. **To save the faces of incompetents.**

The whole history community is culpable. All these errors by the professors presumed to be the authorities were on the shelves of the whole community for half

a century and no one ever challenged them. The translation of pulis and polles as streams was idiotic. Everyone should have seen it and protested. Not to do so **when no evidence whatever had been presented**, is a catastrophe! That is not worthy conduct of academia. Every historian acted as if it were true! They are all culpable. The History Community must be reformed. The only people who can advance the subject lie outside it, because inside, the culture of speculation, not correcting or challenging those in control and telling lies to bury work that is far superior in every way, exercises a stranglehold on all 'work' within it. None of them have the least idea what 'work' means. It does not mean what Barrow did in his article in *The Uses of Place-names in Scottish History*, ed. by Simon Taylor who refers to it as 'work'. Barrow visited none of these places he mentions on p60,61. He got them off that map and failed to realise that they proved the exact opposite of what he believed. GB p169-170. The syllable pol in a place name was, in almost every case, **a decent fraction of a mile from the stream, as if water could be carried that distance every day.** The scale of these maps shows it! The place was beside the pool which caused it to be built. That campsites require water and are chosen because of it, should have told him. The matter is proved in GB Ch VI beyond doubt, the places all photographed and long term residents interviewed to support the facts. Pow, pol, polle, pul and pal all mean pool and there are only four cases: a pool, on its own (Palgowan, Palnackie, Palnure, all near Newton Stewart); a stream reduced to pools when it ceases to flow (Polmoodie, 10 miles NE of Moffat NT 172143 Exp 330, Polmood NT 114270, Pulhare NX087363, Rhynns of Galloway) because it comes out of a col (or a mountain) and the water table falls in summer below the sources; or it comes out of a loch (Polharrow, Pulcree (Water of Fleet NX 598581) and the water level in the loch falls below the exit level, so the stream ceases to flow; or (Pulwhinnrick, Kilstay; Pulinkum, Rhynns of Galloway) where the water pressure, between unduly low hills, cannot drive the stream except after heavy rain and a huge pool results, flows out of it across the shore, rarely (The tide a factor too). Pow? Powflats, Cockspow, Powside, Powblack, Powfoulis, Powdrake, Drypow, Powmill. All mean pool. None have a stream anywhere near. Why Drypow has a pool only sometimes is understood. Powmill is always associated with a stream that dries up and is pools only. The miller got round the problem by constructing a pow (pool) especially large, to act when the stream could not. A sluice from the pow kept the millstone running. One Powmill in 1900 had four such reservoirs: a good advert: flour always produced if the corn is presented, no matter the drought. There is in this paragraph enough detail to show who **has** done the work and that is a small sample of it. Even so, a lot of people will still support the idea that Barrow was right because he was 'a professor'. **If you are one of them, you have failed.** Some academics will definitely fail to accept this: those with an authoritarian cast of mind. That there is important referenced detail will tell them nothing and that may be because they are unaccustomed to providing compelling, complete evidence despite being academics. If Barrow taught them, we know why. **How was 'pow' pronounced in olden time? Poo.** That is so close to 'pool', we know it means pool. This was confirmed by Margaret MacGregor, artist, S. Alloa, John Sneddon, ex pilot, very able, even at 89, who grew up at Airth (and others) and lived at Powfoulis in 2018, and others at Kippen at the other end of the Forth Valley, 25 miles away. It is further confirmed by

some of Pont's maps where the sound is spelt 'pu' in some names (Pont 33 eg). All that provable detail is work. It took years of effort, travel, expense, overnight stays, driven by the passion to know and understand. Why did poo become pow? **Because of the wish to speak politely. It sounded better, raised one's class a notch or two. The original sound had other meanings best forgotten by aspirants to gentility.**

We see that Barrow's problem was an unwillingness to do **any** work. He was content to dream up an answer in a library that made work unnecessary: a speculation, without a trace of investigation or evidence. And people like Simon Taylor treated him like a God, referring respectfully to his 'work', when there isn't any. No wonder he never looked for evidence. Nobody demanded it, expected it. He was a professor. Of course he had to be right. The public, though better educated and intelligent now, still expects the professor to know. This attitude to work needs to be changed. Historians must understand that investigation may take years and evidence must be provided. 'Professors' like Barrow spent a lifetime learning to protect their own profession of excellence by manipulation, gravitas, awards, dishonesty and obstruction; **and no time advancing the knowledge and skill they professed.** The Truth was not the issue; the dominance of his mistaken speculations was. How was he promoted to his chair? By people who knew him and a few of his papers. They must have been like him. Real scholars are different. The paper explaining in full these matters pow, pol, pal, pul, polle will probably appear here at some stage unless a journal is found to print it.

SUMMARY: This paper has shown that the Scottish History community has made no progress in seven centuries in understanding the Battle of Bannockburn. Recent 'work' by four professors reveals no change since Barbour, who wrote in the 14th century (there are many others, no better). Why? Because of the culture of the community, which has only ever believed that nothing could be done to prove anything; so that speculation was the only possible activity. Correcting the speculations of those in control was 'just not done'. Telling lies to save their faces is routine and rife, which means advances, especially by outsiders, are spurned, obstructed and buried. Thus, they have been content to play games among themselves, none of which achieves anything of value. When real work was published in the year 2000 (and since), solving the Bannockburn Problems for the first time, publication of books and papers was obstructed, lies told to the press and anyone else about its value, still ongoing. A further proof of the battle (not just the site) occurs here in two forms: one, using nine chronicle sources plus hundreds of others, of some length, together with a short version for the sake of focusing on essentials. The maps shown, which are referenced, are among the sources, as are their justification, in the books *Bannockburn Revealed*, *Bannockburn Proved* and *The Genius of Bannockburn* (published 2000, 2004/5, 2010 resp.). **The Truth about the battle (about anything!) needs to be the basic requirement of the Community, wherever it is to be found. That is likely to be outside it, where a different education and mindset of accuracy, honesty and insight (free of prejudice) is alone possible. Historians have failed the country by their self-**

**interest, meanness, dishonesty, stupidity, laziness and absence of insight.
And will continue to do so unless the community is reformed.**

William Wallace Cunningham Scott

ⁱ Mathematicians use the word 'proof' continually but rarely bother about its meaning. For them, either it is secure, inviolable and unarguable, or it is not. GH Hardy is an exception, quoted herein.

ⁱⁱ A pension awarded to him and his heirs was transferred to the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral in Aberdeen in 1395.

ⁱⁱⁱ Bannockburn p120 by Brown, Michael, Edinburgh University Press 2008. See GB p 198.

^{iv} A recent work: a trans. of *The Chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker* by David Preest, pub by Boydell, on p xv confirms this as a likely date.

^v No map shows the pools of water in the Carse? Every map does! The zigzag road, Millhall Road has to zig zag across the Carse to get around them. See aerial photos in GB red 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. Roy's map and every other OS map shows the zigzag.

^{vi} Some readers might be comforted to learn that the writer first heard this at Edinburgh University in the final year of an honours maths course. The discussion took a full hour because the lecturer had to spend so long seeing it for himself. Too arrogant to prepare properly or under the weather, perhaps. The version in Hardy's *A Mathematician's Apology* is shorter than this one, more difficult to see then. This is the author's version which tries to take account of the difficulty, as an experienced teacher. When fully understood, it is beautiful. Why? Because it is simple, elegant and certain. The theorem is absolutely true. Hardy's favourite simple proof. Euclid is credited with its discovery in Elements Bk IX Prop 20. There are other versions, some of them more complex, like Euler's. Certainty of this quality is a miracle. That it was discovered by an Alexandrian Greek c300 BC is itself a miracle of human achievement. Were there such things as numbers in Oxford and Cambridge then? When neither existed for another thousand years.

^{vii} Lawyers submissions usually contain several stages, as in maths and (these) history proofs. Clarity and logic are essential; skill with language an advantage, compelling agreement. The best are art forms. However, Quintin Hogg, Lord Hailsham, fellow of All Souls and Lord Chancellor, a very superior advocate, believed in arguing for a single proposition. See *The Door Wherein I Went*, autobiography.

^{viii} *The Mathematical Experience*, p29, Davis, P.J, and Hersh, R. pub Birkhauser, 1981. Hersh was co-author of a book by Paul Cohen 'resolver' of the Continuum Hypothesis in 1963 which satisfied Kurt Gödel. See *The Mathematical Gazette* p73, March 1982, vol 66 no 435, a review of this book by the present writer.

^{ix} See the article in Stirling Observer by the present writer in Feb 28th 2001. The editor was present at a talk she gave when she said this.

^x They also care about money. Why did Oliver and Pollard in their film (2014) not use the Ford as the crossing point of the English and the place where Bruce defended the Road of 1314 and killed de Bohun? Their producer [Falco Boermans] had bought copies (with emails, cheque, by post) of BR and GB from me before they started 'work'. [They were both too busy at other work to do any, which is why they achieved so little]. The Council were to give them £40,000 for their archaeology around the battle site. (Newspaper reports, 2014) But, by then (2010) the Council had passed a huge new building, erected then, within 25 yards of where Bruce killed de Bohun. It desecrated the site. If the Ford were used in the film, the Council would have been found out. Whose head would roll? Would they get paid? They could not reveal the truth and they read it in GB p111 which has a photo of the building. Obstruction. The people do not get the truth because it is inconvenient. The liars are not only in the History Community but in all the organisations contiguous. The truth is not wanted. At least by the folk in charge. No historian in control would, of course, want the Ford to be used in the film, because it would have shown them all up. They demand the credit; would do anything to conceal their failure. To them, my success is their failure. How planning applications in conservation areas can be authorised is in GB p 431-433. In the film, they took the extraordinary action of using a different burn to ride across in the borders to avoid using the real one, as they announced. Nifty camera work hid the building showing it on foot. 'Look we are walking across the Ford.' [but the building is out of the shot]. Anyone who had read the books or knew the place would not have been deceived. The film will be available, or would be until now. Some people will have copies.

^{xi} They know nothing about the work of Sir F.C. Bartlett, F.R.S. It is essential in dating sources. They learned nothing in twenty years. Too arrogant to bother. It is by a psychologist, too much for most of them.